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Prologue 
On April 12, 1995, the Connecticut Superior Court issued its 
long-awaited decision in Sheff v. O'Neill,' the landmark school deseg- 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Stanford University, 1961; 
MS., University of Pennsylvania, 1965; J.D., Pace Law School, 1981; L.L.M. and J.S.D., 
Yale Law School, 1982 and 1984, respectively. The author wishes to thank the Charles A. 
Frueauff Foundation and Pace University School of Law, which provided partial research 
funding for this project; her colleagues, in particular Professor Owen Fiss, whose insightful 
comments improved the quality of this piece; and her research assistant, YiYi Lam, whose 
tireless efforts contributed so much to its publication. 
1. No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. super. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (Apr. 12, 1995). 
[3511 
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regation case. Sheff was the first case since the mid-seventies to chal- 
lenge the doctrine and rationale of federal school desegregation cases 
on the basis of state constitutional provisions alone.2 Specifically, the 
Sheff plaintiffs argued that a metropolitan-wide remedy should be im- 
posed to cure metropolitan-wide school segregation, whether or not 
state action infused with discriminatory intent caused the segregative 
 condition^.^ 
The Sheff case was brought by seventeen African-American, His- 
panic, and White children attending schools in Hartford, Connecticut 
and one of its contiguous suburbs? As is the case in many metropoli- 
tan areas throughout the United States, over 90% of the children at- 
tending the inner city's schools of Hartford are members of minority 
groups: and virtually 100% of the children attending the suburban 
schools are White. The plaintiffs asked the court for a judgment de- 
claring that "separate educational facilities for minority and non-mi- 
nority students are inherently uneq~al."~ They argued that by 
knowingly maintaining public school districts segregated by race and 
ethnicity, the state violated each student's fundamental right to an 
equal educational opportunity? a right clearly established under the 
Education8 and Equal Protectiong Clauses of the Connecticut Consti- 
tution. Plaintiffs asked the court to order the State to require Hart- 
ford and its suburban districts to jointly develop a plan addressing 
these segregative conditions and to reconfigure school district bound- 
aries or take other steps necessary to eliminate educational inequi- 
ties,1° a remedy not available under federal law.ll 
Not surprisingly, the State of Connecticut has based the crux of 
its defense on federal equal protection  standard^?^ It has claimed as a 
threshold matter that unless the plaintiffs prove that state action 
caused the segregative conditions, the state cannot be held responsible 
for correcting those conditions.13 
2. Id at *3-*4. 
3. Id at *23. 
4. Id at "1. 
5. Id at *40. 
6. Id at *3. 
7. Id at "3-*4, *27. 
8. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. See infra note 65 for the text of this provision. 
9. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 and 20. See infia note 66 for the text of these provisions. 
10. Sheff v. O'Neill, No. CV89-0360977S, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS, at *3 (Apr. 12, 
1995). 
11. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
12. Sheff, No. CV89-0360977S, slip op. at *73-*89. 
13. Id at *5, *27-*28. 
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Sheff was filed on April 28, 1989.14 On April 12,1995, the supe- 
rior court held in favor of the State of Connecticut entirely on the 
basis of federal precedents and the federal state action/discriminatory 
intentlcausation standard,15 without any attempt to construe the Con- 
necticut constitutional provisions under which the case had been 
brought. 
On April 27,1995, the Connecticut Supreme Court accepted the 
Sheff case on direct appeal. This led some observers to hope for an 
ultimate decision more in keeping with the Connecticut judiciary's re- 
cent history as one of the leaders in the state constitutional law move- 
ment. On numerous occasions, the Connecticut Supreme Court has 
demonstrated a willingness to provide greater protection for individ- 
ual rights-beyond that provided under the Federal Constitution-by 
giving independent meaning to the state constitutional provisions.16 
This Article reflects on the anomaly of the superior court's deci- 
sion in Sheff in light of this recent history and recommends that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court use an alternative, analytical framework 
based on the Connecticut Constitution to decide the She# appeal. 
This independent approach is equally available to all state courts seek- 
ing to resolve fundamental issues under their own constitutions. Only 
by speaking in a clear, state voice can state courts balance the consti- 
tutional vision of the federal courts and fulfill the promise of the state 
constitutional law movement. 
I. Introduction 
The newly rediscovered vigor and promise of state constitutional 
law has dominated legal discourse since 1977 when Justice Brennan 
issued the following call to arms in his seminal article: 
[Sltate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens 
the full protections of the pledera1 Constitution. State constitu- 
tions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections 
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has 
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit 
the independent protective force of state law-for without it, 
the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.17 
14. Id at *l.  
15. Id at *86-*87. 
16. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text. 
17. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Comtitutiom and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
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Justice Brennan's call for a rebirth of state constitutionalism could be 
construed as merely recommending a return to the original federalist 
principles, which recognize that allocating the powers of government 
among federal and state entities would protect the interests of citizens 
more effectively than concentrating power within one governmental 
entity alone.18 
However, some scholars argue that Justice Brennan was not ad- 
vocating a restrictive view of state constitutionalism in which each 
state turns inward to create an independent constitutional vision 
based on unique state sources and local circumstances. Rather, these 
commentators argue that Justice Brennan was urging state courts to 
rejoin the common enterprise of defining the meaning and the param- 
eters of American constitutional values. Professor Paul Kahn, for ex- 
ample, takes this view of Brennan's intentions and agrees that what is 
needed is not a return to the old federalism but rather an expanded 
American constitutional dialogue in which state courts play a key role: 
"When there is only a single view of the possibilities of law, the mean- 
ing of the constitutional order is impoverished. A democracy that 
does not debate the legal boundaries of its own political choices is 
already failing the constitutional project."lg Professor Kahn urges 
state courts to enter freely into an expanded constitutional dialogue 
on the meaning of American citizenship20 in order to serve as a "pow- 
erful co~nterforce"~~ to the federal courts. 
Since 1977,  commentator^^^ and state courts23 have answered Jus- 
tice Brennan's call for an expanded constitutional dialogue and have 
looked to state constitutional provisions to provide protection for the 
18. Yvonne Kauger, Refections on Federalism: Protections Afforded by State Constitu- 
tions, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 1,l n.1 (1991-92). Kauger quotes from THE FEDERALIST to make 
her point: '"In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is 
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each sub- 
divided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the 
rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time 
that each will be controlled by itself."' Id. at 1 n.1 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 
353,356 (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay), reprinted in THE CENTRAL AW JOURNAL 
Co. (1916)). 
19. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1147, 1155 (1993). Kahn quotes from a portion of Brennan's article which sup- 
ports the view that Brennan saw an activist role for state courts in the national debate: 
"'[Sltate courts [should] thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to 
protect the people of our nation from government intrusions on their freedoms!" Id. at 
1151 (quoting Brennan, supra note 17, at 503) (emphasis added). 
20. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1168. 
21. Id. at 1166. 
22. The volume of scholarship in this area has been documented by other scholars, and 
therefore a lengthy citation will not be given here. Many of the most influential writings 
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rights and liberties of state citizens beyond the minimum of federal 
protections. Today, no commentator and certainly no judge, either 
state or federal, would deny that state courts have the power, and in- 
deed the duty, to independently interpret their own  constitution^.^^ 
Nor has this power been newly-created out of the crucible of late 
twentieth century constitutional theory. From the colonial period un- 
til the federal domination of the rights dialogue began during the War- 
ren Court era, state courts routinely exercised full judicial review25 
and acted to protect the rights and liberties of citizens under their own 
constitutions, many of which predated their federal co~n te rpa r t .~~  
Connecticut's own constitutional history is exemplary in this re- 
gard. Chief Justice Peters has noted that Connecticut is not merely 
called the "Constitution State" because of its role in the creation of 
the Federal Constitution, but rather because by 1638 the Colony had 
promulgated the Fundamental a set of principles referred to 
by many scholars as the world's first written con~titution.~ These Or- 
ders established a democratic form of government and granted signifi- 
cant rights to citizens against the incursions of government.29 
The rights of Connecticut citizens were further expanded by the 
enactment in 1650 of a statutory declaration of rights.30 This declara- 
tion of rights became a body of fundamental law which safeguarded 
on the topic have been cited separately throughout the body of this work. See, e.g., Kahn, 
supra note 19; Kauger, supra note 18. 
23. Recent estimates indicate that in over 450 cases prior to 1992, state courts inter- 
preted state constitutional guarantees as going beyond federal constitutional minimums. 
Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court and Democratic 
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19,27 (1989). See 
also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and The States: The Revival of State Consti- 
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). 
24. For a full discussion of the basis of state court authority in this regard, see infra 
notes 224-228 and accompanying text. 
25. Unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions often expressly provide for the 
exercise of judicial review by state courts. See infra notes 236-240 and accompanying text. 
26, See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
27, Ellen A. Peters, Common Law Antecedents of Constitutional Law in Connecticut, 
53 ALB. L. REV. 259,259-60 (1989) (citing Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1638), re- 
prin~ed in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 249-52 (B. Poore ed., 1878) [hereinafter 
ORGANIC LAWS]). 
28. Robert I. Berdon, The Connecticut Constitution: An Analytical Framework for 
Raking State Constitutional Claims in Connecticut, 14 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 191, 192 (1994). 
29. The Fundamental Orders were later incorporated into and supplemented by the 
charter granted to the colony in 1662 by Charles 11. This charter extended "all the 'liber- 
ties and immunities' of the realm of England" to Connecticut citizens. Henry S. Cohn, 
Connecticut Constitutional History-1636-1776, 64 CONN. B.J. 330, 335 (1990). 
30. Berdon, supra note 28, at 192. 
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individual rights and liberties by granting equal protection and provid- 
ing for due process and the protection of reputation?' Other rights 
now termed "constitutional"-such as freedom of religion, the right to 
legal counsel, protection against double jeopardy and defamation, 
rules against censorship and unreasonable searches and seizures- 
were also protected by the Connecticut courts under a variety of com- 
mon law  antecedent^.^^ 
Therefore, long before the Federal Constitution was drafted and 
even prior to the enactment of Connecticut's first formal constitution 
in 1818P3 Connecticut courts freely invoked a rich body of state law to 
protect individual rights.34 Except for the period during which the 
vast expansion of constitutional protections by the federal courts 
seemed to cast doubt on the continuing need for an independent state 
constitutional jurisprudence, Connecticut state courts have continu- 
ously exercised their authority to resolve controversy and safeguard 
the liberties of citizens under the fundamental laws of their state. 
In Connecticut, as in other states, however, the effort of the state 
judiciary to emerge from the torpor caused by federal domination was 
hampered by a series of state constitutional cases which declared that 
state provisions were to be interpreted as having "like meaning and 
similar limitations" to their federal co~nterparts.3~ After a somewhat 
31. Id at 194. From the date of enactment, these statutory rights were occasionally 
amended to provide additional rights, but never to curtail previously existing rights. Id at 
192. 
32. Peters, supra note 27, at 261. That Connecticut citizens possessed a wide body of 
human rights safeguarded by the civil government was well understood in the eighteenth 
century. Legal commentators of the time, such as Judge Jesse Root, charged the state with 
the responsibility of ensuring "the advancement of order, peace and happiness in society, 
by protecting its members in the quiet enjoyment of their natural, civil, and religious rights 
and liberties." ROOTS REPORTS xvi (1789-1793), quoted in Ellen A. Peters, Slate Supreme 
Courts in our Evolving Federal System, 17 Intergovernmental Persps. 21,21 (1991) [herein- 
after Peters, Evolving Federal System]. 
33. CONN. CONST. of 1818, reprinted in 1 ORGANIC LAWS, supra note 27, at 258-66. 
34. Chief Justice Peters has suggested that Connecticut constitutional law, statutory 
law, and natural and common law principles were all endowed with what would today be 
called a "constitutional penumbra." Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 21. 
Peters has also observed that it is this multifaceted nature of Connecticut constitutional 
history that 
provides our state constitutional law with a starting point that is different from 
federal constitutional law. A constitutional tradition that does not draw hard 
lines of separation between constitutional, statutory, and common law precepts 
emphasizes that . . . a state court must cast a wide net in searching for guidance to 
resolve invariably troublesome constitutional controversies. 
Id at 22. 
35. Virtually all states have had such "like meaning" cases to contend with. See, for 
example, Cyphers v. Allyn, 118 A.2d 318,321 (Conn. 1955). but other examples abound. 
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slow and inconsistent start, Connecticut courts have acted to repudi- 
ate these precedents. Two cases in particular, Fasulo v. Arafeh36 and 
Horton v. Me~ki11,3~ recognized the "primary independent vitality of 
the provisions of our own constituti~n,"~~ and indicated that state and 
federal provisions do not have to be read with like meaning and simi- 
lar limitations. Although federal case law may be considered by state 
courts in adjudicating state constitutional this consideration 
"in no way compromises [the state courts'] obligation independently 
to construe the provisions of our state constit~tion."~~ 
In line withthis obligation, Connecticut courts have responded to 
Justice Brennan's call to rejoin the constitutional discourse. As the 
United States Supreme Court has moved inexorably to subordinate 
individual rights to private and governmental interests in the areas of 
equal protection:l criminal pr~cedure:~ free exer~ise,~" 
procedural due process45 and others, the Connecticut judiciary has ex- 
36. 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977). 
37. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). 
38. Id at 371. Although the old "like meaning" language occasionally finds its way 
into current cases, the term now appears to stand for the proposition that the Connecticut 
Constitution "shares but is not limited by the content of its federal counterpart." Fmulo, 
378 A.2d at 554. 
39. State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 1232 (Conn. 1992), sets forth an analytical frame- 
work for state constitutional claims. The tools of analysis to be considered are: first, the 
text of the state constitutional provision in question; then, the holdings and dicta of the 
supreme and appellate courts of the state; federal precedents; sister state decisions; history; 
and economic and sociological considerations. 
40. State v. Lamme, 579 A.2d 484,490 (Conn. 1990). 
41. See, for example, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Village of Arling- 
ton Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Personnel Adm'r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). all of which imposed a discriminatory intent standard for 
federal equal protection cases. See also City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) (invalidating minority set aside plan); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no fundamental right to education under the Federal 
Constitution). 
42. See, eg., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (finding no constitutional basis 
for keeping victim impact evidence from the jury in capital cases). 
43. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (state statute criminalizing ho- 
mosexual sodomy upheld). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980), and other recent abortion cases which, while confirming a woman's continuing right 
to an abortion under Roe v. Wade, 400 U.S. 113 (1973). nonetheless sanction state laws 
placing limits on that right or placing restrictions on those women who can exercise it. 
44. See, e.g., Employment Div., Ore. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (state may deny unemployment benefits to those who engage in the use of drugs in 
religious ceremonies). 
45. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no right to 
counsel in parental status termination proceedings). 
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panded the rights of citizens under state constitutional provisions in 
several key areas. In Doe v. Maherp6 for example, the court rejected 
the approach taken by the United States supreme Court in Harris v. 
M c R ~ ~ ~ ~  and struck down, under the state Due Process Clause, a Con- 
necticut regulation restricting the right to medicaid payment for abor- 
t ion~.~* In State v. the court created a rule different from the 
federal courts on the ultimate right to call a witness under Article I, 
Section 8 of the state constitution. Griswold Inn, Inc. v. Stateso ex- 
panded state protection of religious freedoms beyond the federal 
model. An expansion of rights has also occurred in several other key 
areas, including search and seizure?l substantive due and 
freedom of expre~sion.~~ 
By the time State v. Dukes54 was decided in 1988, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court could firmly state that, although Connecticut courts 
are free to follow the lead of the federal courts at their discretion, 
"this court has never considered itself bound to adopt the federal in- 
terpretation in interpreting the Connecticut [Clonstitution. . . . Thus, 
in a proper case 'the law of the land' may not, in [the] state constitu- 
tional context, also be 'the law of the [Sltate of Connectic~t.'"~~ 
46. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). 
47. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
48. 515 A3d at 450. 
49. 506 A.2d 86 (Conn. 1986). 
50. 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981). 
51. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993) (invalidating as a matter of 
state constitutional law, warrantless automobile search conducted while automobile is im- 
pounded at police station); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting claim 
that emergency situation existed to support police officer's warrantless entry into hit and 
run driver's house in order to arrest him); State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992) 
(rejecting claim that police officer had reasonable basis for suspicion to seize defendant). 
52. See, e.g., Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101 
(Conn. 1994) (holding that statute prohibiting party engaged in business of selling motor 
vehicles from selling them on Sunday violates substantive due process under Connecticut 
Constitution). 
53. See, e.g., Dow v. New Haven Indep., Inc., 549 A.2d 683 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1987) 
(holding that statements in editorials, clearly labeled as such, about public officials con- 
cerning matters of public concern, are entitled to an absolute, unconditional privilege). 
54. 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988). 
55. Id at 18-19. See also id at 17 (citing State v. Stoddard, 537 A2d 446 (Conn. 1988); 
State v. Jarzbek, 529 A.2d 1245 (Conn. 1987); State v. Scully, 490 A.2d 984 (Conn. 1985); 
State v. Couture, 482 A.2d 300 (Conn. 1984) and others, including Horton v. Meskill, 376 
A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977), and Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977)). Connecticut's 
independence in constitutional adjudication is but a part of the nationwide trend. Many 
other state supreme courts have been developing a different constitutional vision than that 
which is developing under federal law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 
N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984); Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985); Wein 
v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1976) and Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1977). 
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One of the most important examples of the state judiciary's will- 
ingness to forge an alternative constitutional vision for Connecticut 
came in Horton v. Me~kill?~ a 1977 case in which plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of Connecticut's school financing scheme. Just 
four years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had faced an al- 
most identical challenge in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
R o d r i g ~ e z . ~ ~  
The Court decided Rodriguez during a period of intense debate 
over whether the right to equal access to education should be added 
to the expanding list of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Brown v. Board of E d ~ c a t i o n ~ ~  had suggested as much 
almost twenty years earlier.59 In Rodriguez the Court, which techni- 
cally had been asked to determine whether the school finance laws of 
Texas violated the United States Constitution, was in fact being asked 
to reflect on ,much more: the role of education in a democracy. In a 
five-to-four decision, the Rodriguez Court upheld the Texas financing 
laws despite the substantial disparities in funding between districts 
with predominantly poor, nonwhite students and districts which had 
predominantly affluent, White studenk60 The Court also found that 
education was not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment61 and that the poor were not a suspect class for federal equal 
protection purposes.62 Rodriguez was one of the first federal educa- 
tion cases to place educational policymaking back into state hands. In 
particular, the job of determining the meaning of "an equal educa- 
tional opportunity" was effectively returned to the states. As some 
commentators suggested, in some ways this was a welcome return to 
normalcy.63 
Four years later, when Horton6" challenged the Connecticut 
school financing scheme, it seemed that the task had passed back into 
56. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). 
57. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
59. "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov- 
ernments. . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities 
. . . . It is the very fozcndation of good citizenship.. . . In these days, it is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education." Id at 493 (emphasis added). 
60. 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973). See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN 
IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 214 (1991). 
61. 411 U.S. at 33. 
62. Id at 36-37. 
63. Bernard James &Julie M. Hoffman, Brown in State Hands.- State Policymaking and 
Educational Equality Afrer Freeman v. Pitts, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 521,525 (1993). 
64. 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). 
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safe hands. Acting decisively to reject the approach taken by the 
United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court interpreted the E d ~ c a t i o n ~ ~  and Equal P r ~ t e c t i o n ~ ~  Clauses of 
the Connecticut Constitution as together creating a fundamental right 
to an equal educational opport~ni ty .~~ Finding that wide disparities in 
funding between rich and poor school districts were violative of this 
fundamental equality right, the court in Horton struck down the 
state's school finance scheme.68 
65. CONN. CONST. art. VIII, 9 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary and 
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by 
appropriate legislation."). 
66. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All men when they form a social compact, are equal in 
rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges 
from the community.") and 9 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the 
law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his 
civil or political right because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin."). 
67. Horton, 376 A.2d at 369-70. 
68. Id Many other states have taken part in this important educational equality de- 
bate since Rodriguez. By 1993, courts in thirty-three states had decided challenges to the 
constitutionality of school finance schemes. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and 
Judicial Review of Positive Rights C l a i m  The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive 
Government, 24 Rutgers L.J. 1057, 1079 n.112 (1993). In fifteen states, the financing sys- 
tems were held to be unconstitutional. Id In many of these cases, education was also 
found to be a fundamental right under state constitutional law, as was the case in Connecti- 
cut. See, e.g., Shostall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 v. 
Dupree, No. 77-406 (Ch. Ct., Pulaski City, Ark. Oct. 26,1981); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 
11) ,557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Rose v. Council 
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Somerset County Bd. of Educ. v. 
Hornbeck, No. A-58438 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore, Md., May 19,1981): Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. 
v. Montana, 769 P2d 684 (1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973). cerL denied, 
414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Kukor v. Grover, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (Wisc. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979); Washakie County 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
In eighteen of the thirty-three states, the challenged state finance scheme was upheld. 
Feldman, supra, at 1079 n.112. In several of these cases, courts appeared to rely on the 
separation of powers doctrine, fearing that to direct the state legislature to alter its school 
funding policies would place the court in the position of a superlegislature. See, e.g., 
Thompson v. Engel King, 537 P2d 635,640 (Idaho 1975). Some scholars argue, however, 
that reliance on this doctrine is but one more device employed by state courts to avoid 
their responsibility to flesh out the meaning of equality in an educational setting. Feldman, 
for example,.suggests that although a state legislature may be empowered by the state 
constitution to develop policy and allocate funds for public education, only the state judici- 
ary can decide the content of positive state constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a 
free and public education. Feldman, supra, at 1087. 
Other scholars have suggested that the idea that a state legislature acting alone can 
decide the constitutional parameters of an equal educational opportunity may have re- 
sulted from a "fundamentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review." James & 
Hoffman, supra note 63, at 555 (quoting Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the '%lit- 
ical Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (1985)). See also Peter J .  Galie. The Other 
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Interpreting the Connecticut Equal Protection Clauses in Horton, 
the state supreme court opted to retain the "tiers of scrutiny" ap- 
proach of the federal courts, but declined to import the federal state 
action/discriminatory intentJcausation threshold test for finding gov- 
ernment resp~nsibility.~~ At most, the court applied an "effects" test 
that requires a showing that a specific condition, such as an inequity in 
school financing, "resulted" from delegating legislation. Once shown, 
the court could conclude that such a result constitutes a violation of 
both the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitution 
and the duty to provide for equal educational opportunity by taking 
"appropriate legislative action."70 Unencumbered by the separation 
of powers doctrine which burdened other states in making this deci- 
sion, the Connecticut Supreme Court instructed the state legislature 
to develop appropriate legislation that would minimize the funding 
disparities between school districts in keeping with the fundamental 
right to a substantially equal educational ~pportuni ty .~~ 
The Horton case, and many of the Connecticut constitutional 
cases discussed above which followed during the next decade, rein- 
forced the impression that the Connecticut judiciary was determined 
to exercise its independence from federal court domination and to 
summon the "strength and the will to undertake the painstaking task 
of assigning independent meaning to independent state constitu- 
t i o n ~ . " ~ ~  In fact, until the Connecticut Superior Court decision in 
Shefiv. O'Neill was announced in April 1995,73 it appeared that Con- 
necticut courts had entered the expanded constitutional dialogue with 
vigor and become exemplars of the kind of new state constitutional- 
ism lauded by Professors Bernard James and Julie Hoffman in their 
recent work on the topic: 
Whatever one may think of the phenomenon of modem state 
constitutional law in the abstract, it is now clear beyond quibble 
that these documents have become the cloth out of which mod- 
Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731 
(1982) and Joshua S. Lichtenstein, Note, Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Consti- 
tutional Commitment to Equal Educational Opportunity, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 429 (1991). 
Interestingly. four of the states which upheld their state finance systems, Arizona, 
Maryland, West Virginia and Wisconsin. nevertheless found a fundamental right to educa- 
tion under their state constitutions. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 548 n.128. 
69. 376 A.2d at 369. 
70. Id at 376. 
71. Id. 
72. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradi- 
tion, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583,593 (1986) (book review of DEVELOPMENTS IN TATE CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL LAW (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)) [hereinafter State Constitutional Law]. 
73. No. CV89-0360977s. 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1148, at *1 (Apr. 12, 1995). 
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em social compacts are woven. . . . [Sltate constitutions are 
being used to provide a forum for both discussion and resolution 
of the major issues of the day.74 
In light of this recent history, it would seem that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court's decision in Horton would have impelled the lower 
court to take the next logical step in Sheff. Recall that in Horton, the 
court found that the specific condition of inequity in school financing 
resulted from delegating legislation and constituted a violation by the 
State of both the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Consti- 
tution and the duty to provide for equal educational opportunity by 
appropriate legi~lation.7~ The Sheff plaintiffs argued that Sheff is a 
"perfect analog" to HortonJ6 Indeed, it seems a very short step to 
find in Sheff that another specific condition-the racial and ethnic seg- 
regation of the schools in Hartford and its suburbs-also resulted 
from delegating legislation by the state. This legislation created local 
school districts and attendance zones which have made racially bal- 
anced schools, also required under Connecticut law, impossible to 
achieve in metropolitan areas throughout Connecticut. This statutory 
scheme may, therefore, also constitute a violation of both the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitution and the duty to 
provide for equal educational opportunity by appropriate legislation. 
Missing the analogy completely, the lower court in Sheff failed to 
take the next step. Distinguishing Horton on dubious grounds, the 
court stated that the Horton plaintiffs were attacking only the specific 
statute which created the school finance system, whereas the Sheff 
plaintiffs were challenging the present condition of racial segregation 
in the Hartford sch0ols.7~ Yet, how is it possible that a landmark case 
brought solely under state constitutional provisions could prompt a 
lower court decision utterly devoid of any analysis of those state pro- 
visions? How is it possible that after six years of adjudication, the 
court could decide this case based entirely upon federal standards and 
cases? The Sheff court found that "the plaintiffs have failed to prove 
that 'state action is a direct and sufficient cause of the conditions' 
which are the subject matter of the plaintiffs' complaint . . . and that 
accordingly the constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiffs need 
not be addres~ed."~~ 
74. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 526. 
75. 376 A.2d 359,376 (Conn. 1977). 
76. Sheff, No. (389-0360977S, slip op. at *66. 
77. Id at *67-*68. 
78. Id. at *89. 
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There are no easy answers to these questions. Perhaps it was sim- 
ply a case too hot to handle, or a failure of judicial nerve when con- 
fronted with an issue pregnant with enormous societal and political 
implications. Certainly, in retrospect, the Rodriguez case passed some 
relatively easy educational issues back into state hands. Unlike the 
Federal Constitution, virtually every state constitution has an educa- 
tion clause which mandates, or at least permits, the state legislature to 
provide for a free and public state educational ~ystem.7~ Only a short 
step was required for some state courts to declare that this positive 
right guaranteed to all citizens was also fundamental under their 
state's constitutional scheme. The issue of equalizing state funding for 
education so as to minimize the disparities in the educational opportu- 
nities offered to rich and poor children, though somewhat more con- 
troversial, has nonetheless been tackled by the majority of states 
following Rodriguez, albeit with differing outcomes.80 
Prior to the Sheflcase, however, no state had been forced to face 
the monumental and politically charged equality issue left over from 
the United States Supreme Court's school desegregation decisions in 
Keyes v. School District No. Milliken v. B r a d l e ~ , ~ ~  and their prog- 
eny: Is a student's right to an equal educational opportunity violated 
when a state's system of school districting and attendance zones re- 
sults in that student attending a segregated school? 
Surely this is one of the most troubling issues of our time, espe- 
cially in the North where in scores of metropolitan areas similar in 
character to Hartford and its surrounding suburbs, children attend 
schools every day in segregative conditions that seem impossible to 
imagine forty years after Brown. Virtually every federal school deseg- 
regation decision since Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed- 
ucationS3 has narrowed the Brown mandate and handed the states 
79. David Donnont, Separate and Unequal: School District Financing, 11 LAW AND 
INEQUALITY 261,276 (1992). 
80. See supra note 68 for discussion of the outcomes of challenges to school finance 
schemes in thirty-three states. 
81. 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding desegregation remedies for southern schools ap- 
proved in earlier cases are equally applicable to northern school districts never segregated 
by law, but only where local officials had pursued deliberately segregative policies). 
82. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting a metropolitan-wide remedy for Detroit and holding 
that it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of state or local school districts, or of 
a single school district, have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation). 
83. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For cases after Swann which have consistently pulled back from 
ordering all-out desegregation remedies, see Keyes, 413 U.S. 189 (1979), and Milliken, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974). See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In 
that case, the City had met its goals in the areas of pupil assignment and the hiring and 
promoting of teachers and administrators for one year, but not thereafter. Id. at 431. The 
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convenient doctrines which they might employ effectively should they 
wish to avoid facing the issue altogether. The de jurelde facto distinc- 
tion, the discriminatory intentlcausation standard, the local control of 
schools imperative, the separation of powers doctrine, and the state 
action requirement used so effectively by Judge Hammer in Sheff, 
have all served to insulate states from the moral imperative of Brown 
and often enabled state courts to turn a deaf ear to the inequality 
claims of school-aged  plaintiff^.^" 
What might help account for the anomaly of a state declaring ed- 
ucation to be a fundamental right, but then treating educational equal- 
ity as merely an option, is a philosophy which values liberty over 
equality and extols the virtues of local control and the private "free" 
choices of individuals to move to suburbs with the guarantee of all- 
white schools. Professors James and Hoffman have described "a curi- 
ous pattern of resistance among states to a notion of 'equality of edu- 
cational opportunity' if it truly means 'equality of opportunity through 
education' and an equal chance to succeed."85 It would seem that this 
resistance becomes especially pronounced if it is suggested that a child 
only has a chance to succeed in the majority culture if she is allowed 
to attend schools alongside members of that culture. 
Court held that one year of compliance justified removing the issue of pupil assignment 
from the remedial authority of the courts, thereby assuring resegregation. Id. at 434-45. 
See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 533. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 
(1992), in which the Court, faced with racially identifiable schools in DeKalb County. 
Georgia, reasoned that these segregative conditions were caused by free demographic 
choices. Id at 494. Judges thereafter had the discretion to measure incremental progress 
toward unitariness and relinquish jurisdiction over those areas free of the vestiges of offi- 
cial race-based policymaking. The most recent of these cases, Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. 
Ct. 2038 (1995), held that the State of Missouri could stop supporting the Kansas City 
schools (where $1.5 billion has been spent to date to build the nation's finest educational 
facilities without producing any measurable improvement in student achievement), even 
though no improvement in test scores has yet been produced. Id at 2055-56. Apparently, 
the improvement in educational outcomes will no longer be the test for relinquishing fed- 
eral court jurisdiction over a district's desegregation plan, even if that improvement has 
been established as one of the major objectives of the plan. As a further slap to the district 
court in the case, the Supreme Court also disapproved Kansas City's goal of building mag- 
net schools to attract White students back from the suburbs, as an impermissible way to 
achieve an interdistrict remedy where no discriminatory intent had been proven. Id at 
2051. 
84. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 526. 
85. Id. at 572. Jonathan Kozol has reflected on the underlying cause of this resistance: 
"This, then, is the dread that seems to lie beneath the fear of equalizing. Equity is seen as 
dispossession. Local autonomy is seen as liberty . . . . Again there is this stunted image of 
our nation as a land that can afford one of two dreams-liberty or equity-but cannot 
manage both." K o z o ~ ,  supra note 60, at 173. 
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The Sheff case forced the court to reflect on the hardest questions 
left in the educational equity debate: Does attendance at a segregated 
school violate a child's right to an equal educational opportunity no 
matter how these segregative conditions have arisen? Does the 
Brown conclusion that separate educational facilities for minority and 
nonrninority students are "inherently unequaYS6 have any continuing 
resonance for a state court deciding this issue under its own constitu- 
tion's equal protection guarantees? Can a state court be expected to 
rule against majoritarian will and order a mandatory metropolitan- 
wide remedy for metropolitan-wide segregation, a remedy which no 
other state official in his right mind would support and no federal 
court since Milliken has had the courage or wisdom to impose? 
Certainly the challenge to the lower court in Sheff was great. But 
great also was the opportunity to say in a clear state voice, "the em- 
peror has no clothes." Meaningful progress in desegregation has not 
occurred since the early seventiess7 when many court-ordered plans 
were implemented in the South, in spite of the fact that many of those 
plans have been successful and have provided voluminous research 
evidence in support of those successes.88 Outside of these enclaves of 
success, however, the realities of a minority child's life remain remark- 
ably unchanged. As many scholars have noted, the goal of racial inte- 
gration has not yet been achieved; educational opportunity is still 
dependant on where a child happens to live.89 Over forty years after 
Brown, 63.3% of all black children still attend segregated scho01s~~ 
and in twenty-five of the nation's largest inner-city school districts, - 
more racially segregated schools exist today than in 1954.91 
In Connecticut, where black students account for only 12.1% of 
the school-aged population, 60.3% attend segregated schools located 
in the inner cities, which are, in many cases, poorly equipped and 
maintained?2 Over the past four years, this author visited numerous 
86. Brown v. Board of Educ, 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954). 
87. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573. 
88. See infra Part III(b) for a discussion of these results and a description of some of 
the outcomes in successfully desegregated districts. 
89. See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573; K o z o ~ ,  supra note 60, passim; 
Dormont, supra note 79, at 264. 
90. See James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573 (citing ANDREW HACKER, TWO NA- 
TIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE. UNEQUAL 162 (1992)). The authors also 
point out that these statistics only refer to African-American children. Id Integration for 
other minorities has never really begun. 
91. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 573 (citing Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the 
Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285 (1992)). 
92. James & Hoffman, supra note 63, at 575 n.256. 
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schools in Connecticut and made several trips to the South to study 
five counties which have succeeded in their 20-year investment in de- 
segregation plans. Their cities and their schools are safe and produc- 
tive, while Connecticut's are often dangerous and filled with de~pair.9~ 
This present-day reality serves as a compelling reminder of Professor 
Kahn's warning that "[a] democracy that does not debate the legal 
boundaries of its own political choices is already failing the constitu- 
tional project."94 
The lower court in Sheff failed to take up its "independent re- 
sponsibility" to interpret the Connecticut constitution in light of to- 
day's realitie~?~ Now, the Connecticut Supreme Court has the 
opportunity to criticize the restricted constitutional vision of the fed- 
eral courts upon which the lower court's decision was based, and to 
develop an independent state approach to metropolitan-wide school 
segregation which might help to resolve, rather than perpetuate, one 
of our society's most persistent and destructive problems. 
This Article develops an alternative analytical approach to the 
assignment of state responsibility in school desegregation cases and 
proposes a pathway which state courts might utilize in responding to 
the issues raised in such cases with a clear, state voice. In Part II(a), I 
recommend that a state court construing the provisions of its own con- 
stitution reject the federal standard in school desegregation cases for 
several reasons: because the current federal approach to the assess- 
ment of governmental responsibility in such cases is based on an ar- 
guably flawed legal theory; because it is not mandated by either the 
United States Constitution or federal precedent; and because it has 
proven inadequate to the task of providing a satisfactory remedy to 
metropolitan-wide segregation. In Part II(b), I argue that state courts 
should also reject the federal approach because it has evolved from 
the federal courts' concern for federalism, the state action require- 
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other institutional and func- 
tional differences which are wholly irrelevant to and do not limit the 
power of state courts to resolve issues under state constitutional 
provisions. 
93. See infra Part III(b) for a discussion of the outcomes produced by successfully 
desegregated schools. 
94. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1155. 
95. "State constitutions must.. . be construed to relate open-ended constitutional lan- 
guage to modem-day reality. . . . [Sltate judges bear an independent responsibility for 
making state constitutions adaptable to current conditions." Peters, State Constifutional 
Law, supra note 72, at 586. 
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In Part III(a), I propose an independent, state constitutional ap- 
proach to the issues presented in the Sheff case. This approach is 
based on the need in school desegregation cases for an effects-based 
jurisprudence focused on the segregative conditions themselves and 
the possibilities for resolving them-an approach fully supported by 
the express language of Connecticut's own equal protection guaran- 
tees and the Connecticut case law construing those guarantees. Such 
an approach is equally available to all state courts deciding such cases 
under their own constitutions. In Part III(b), I argue that school de- 
segregation has proven successful in areas of the country where it has 
been "done right," and review the results of empirical research studies 
that affirm the value of racially balanced schools to both minority and 
nonminority students, as well as to our society at large. 
lTa. The Failed Federal Standard 
In the early 1970s, two United States Supreme Court cases 
pointed toward an enlightened school desegregation doctrine in which 
courts moved away from condemning only those cases of segregation 
where assignments were explicitly race-based to a result-oriented ap- 
proach that focused on segregative conditions and their effects.96 In 
Green v. County School Board," the Court invalidated a presumedly 
race-neutral student assignment plan based on "freedom-of-choice," 
where the result of the plan was continued racial segregation?* The 
Court expanded this approach in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Educ~tion,9~ by declaring "geographic proximity" an imper- 
missible basis for student assignment because the plan did not "work" 
in diminishing the segregated condition of the schools,100 and by or- 
dering the Board of Education to achieve the "greatest possible de- 
gree" of actual desegregation that it could with an interdistrict 
remedy.lol 
Many commentators at the time would have agreed with Profes- 
sor Owen Fiss that 
the net effect of [Swann was] to move school desegregation doc- 
trine further along the continuum toward a result-oriented ap- 
- 
96. Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-ZB Significance for Northern 
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI.  L. REV. 697, 704-05 (1971) [hereinafter Charlotte- 
~ecklenburgj. - 
97. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
98. Id at 441-42. 
99. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
100, Id at 20. 
101. Id. at26. 
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proach . . . . [In] retrospect, [Swann] will then be viewed, like 
Green, as a way-station to the adoption of a general approach to 
school desegregation which, by focusing on the segregated pat- 
terns themselves, is more responsive to the school segregation of 
the North.lo2 
Two factors, one internal and the other external, conspired 
against the continuation of this trend: first, the language of the cases 
themselves; and second, a new process-based theory of constitutional 
law then gaining ascendancy in the academy and the courts. 
Although Swann is, in part, result-oriented and enormously pro- 
ductive in terms of remedy, that case carried within it the seeds of a 
doctrinal trend which veered away from a focus on segregated condi- 
tions and back toward a focus on past discriminatory practices. Pro- 
fessor Fiss noted the danger in this element of the Court's approach 
but discounted it for two reasons. First, he believed that, although the 
Court had spoken in terms of causation and past discrimination in 
Swann, their real concern was the segregated pattern of school attend- 
ance which still existed in Mecklenberg County.lo3 Otherwise such an 
"all-out" remedy could not be defended.lo4 Second, the Court's the- 
ory of causation "seemed c~ntrived."'~~ As in all of the southern de- 
segregation cases, the evidence of past discrimination could hardly be 
refuted. Nevertheless, there is no language in Swann which reveals an 
attempt to determine the degree to which past discrimination has led 
to current segregative conditions.lo6 Rather, Professor Fiss believes, 
the Court used past discrimination as a "'trigger' . . . for a cannon," 
the all-out desegregation remedy, as well as a way to "preserve the 
continuity with Brown and add a moral quality to its decision."lo7 Ad- 
ditionally, Professor Fiss predicted that the result-oriented language 
of Swann would outlive the past discrimination/causa1 link require- 
ment since the Court would be unable to treat segregated conditions 
in northern and southern schools differently: 
. A complicated analysis of causation might. . . serve to justify the 
differential treatment afforded these otherwise identical pat- 
terns. But such an analysis is not likely to be understood or 
even believed by most people. And no national institution can 
afford to be unresponsive to the popular pressures likely to be 
102. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 704-05. 
103. Id at 705. 
104. Id. 
105. Id 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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engendered by an appearance of differential treatment of cer- 
tain regions of the country.108 
Immediately following Swann, these confident predictions of a 
trend toward a result-oriented jurisprudence in school desegregation 
cases seemed well-founded. District courts, while paying heed to the 
discriminatory intentlcausal link element of the Court's decision, 
found these requirements to be easily satisfied in a variety of creative 
ways, such as finding government responsibility in cases where a seg- 
regated condition is the foreseeable and avoidable consequence of 
government action,lo9 or when government has failed to act when 
under a duty to do so, even if no actual causal link to discriminatory 
animus could be proved.l1° Some courts adopted the burden-shifting 
approach taken in Swann, where, once the plaintiff had shown a segre- 
gated condition existed, the State was forced to prove that its actions 
had not caused that condition to be created or maintained.ll' 
This jurisprudential trend might have continued had an external 
factor not intervened: a new process-based theory of constitutional 
law.l12 Those espousing this theory maintained that in a democratic 
society, essentially nondemocratic institutions such as courts should 
108. Id 
109. Id at 706. See also infra notes 250-251 and accompanying text. 
110. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 706-07. As Professor Fiss has said in 
another context, "An individual who starts a boulder rolling down a hill is responsible for 
the expected consequences; but the individual who gives the boulder the initial shove and 
at the same time possesses the power to stop it, or at least deflect it, at any point on its 
journey down the hill, is even more responsible for the outcome." Owen M. Fiss, Racial 
Imbalance in the Public Schook The Constitutions] Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564,585 
(1965) [hereinafter Fiss, Constitutional Concepts]. 
111. This burden-shifting approach was also used by the Connecticut Supreme Court in 
Horton v. Meskill (Horton 111). 486 A.2d 1099, 1110 (Conn. 1985). 
112. Many commentators participated in the "process-based" dialogue in the 1970s and 
1980s. Among the leading proponents were ALEXANDER BICKEL, whose book, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS. was pub- 
lished in 1962. In his other books, such as THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) and THE 
JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1984). Bickel expanded on his theories of 
judicial review (the public value theory, the procedural value theory, and the political 
value theory), all of which stressed the prudence of conservatism in judicial decisions. 
Another influential member of the "process-based" theory group was JOHN H. ELY, 
whose book, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), was 
enormously influential, along with many of his articles, such as Legislative and Administra- 
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Constitutionality of Re- 
verse Racial Discrimination, 41 U .  CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Supreme Court 1977 Term- 
Foreword. On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Toward a Rep- 
resentation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978); Constitutional 
Inferpretivisrn: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. LJ. 399 (1978). Ely's theory of judicial 
review conceived the role of courts to be that of merely perfecting the procedural precon- 
ditions for a representative democracy. 
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avoid reviewing the substance or the fairness of governmental deci- 
sionmaking and should intervene only if the decisionmaking process 
had become adulterated.lI3 In equal protection terms, this adultera- 
tion was seen as resulting from forbidden discriminatory 
 motivation^.^'^ 
The rapid ascendancy of process-based theories in the scholarly 
literature coincided with the beginning of a period of retrenchment in 
the Supreme Court which occurred precisely at the time the Court 
decided the first "northern7' school desegregation case in 1973. In 
Keyes v. School District No. the Court held that the desegregation 
remedies approved in Swann were equally applicable to northern 
school districts which had never been segregated by law, but only 
where local officials had pursued deliberately segregative p~licies."~ 
Keyes was followed by Milliken v. Bradley,l17 in which the Court 
rejected a metropolitan-wide desegregation remedy for Detroit, hold- 
ing that "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state 
or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a sub- 
stantial cause of interdistrict segregation."l18 This rejection left un- 
corrected the vestiges of school segregation that the lower courts had 
found in Detroit, vestiges which the Supreme Court had ordered re- 
moved "root and branch" throughout the South.llg 
The final pieces of the current Court's equal protection doctrine 
were put into place with three cases which left no doubt as to the 
emerging doctrinal trend. First, in Washington v. Davis,120 the Court 
held that in the absence of a racially discriminatory motive or pur- 
pose, a facially neutral governmental action, which has an adverse ra- 
113. Many commentators such as Paul Kahn have criticized this process-based ap- 
proach to judicial review. Professor Kahn observes that the current federal approach to 
constitutional analysis narrows the constitutional vision of the federal courts, but it need 
not affect state courts in the same way if they re-enter the constitutional dialogue with an 
independent voice. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1152. Professor Kahn would agree, I think, 
that to narrow the reach of courts by viewing them as nonmajoritarian institutions misun- 
derstands their fundamental role in our democratic system, where "[c]onstitutional dis- 
course is the inquiry into the legal boundaries of majoritarian choice." Id. at 1160 
(emphasis added). 
114. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105 (1989). 
115. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
116. Id. at 213. 
117. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
118. Id. at 744-45. 
119. Id at 780 (White, J., dissenting). See also Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
437-38 (1968). 
120. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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cia1 impact, such as the use of screening tests in hiring, will not be 
subject to strict scrutiny.121 Second, in Village of ~ r l i n ~ t o n  Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation,lZ the Court held 
that race must be shown to be a motivating factor in the refusal to 
rezone land for low-income housing and that disproportionate impact 
alone would not satisfy the intent standard.123 And finally, in Person- 
nel Administrator v. Feei~ey, '~~ the Court refused to import into equal 
protection jurisprudence the familiar doctrine that a person intends 
the natural and foreseeable consequences of voluntary actions, a doc- 
trine which had been used productively by district courts in satisfying 
the intentlcausation requirement in school desegregation cases.125 
Over time, these and other federal court decisions imposing a dis- 
criminatory intenthausation standard, have had a devastating effect 
on the Brown desegregation mandate. Since the mid-1970s, some 
plaintiffs have successfully proved a constitutional violation based on 
discriminatory intent, although most commentators would agree that 
their task has been made inordinately more difficult.IZ6 Courts have 
ordered desegregation plans implemented in Dayton,12' Columbus,128 
Yonkers,12g Kansas City,130 and a few other cities since that time. But 
because of the Court's refusal to countenance a metropolitan-wide 
remedy in Detroit, all cases following Milliken have restricted the 
remedy to the cities themselves, where most of the minorities affected 
by the vestiges of segregation still reside. This has made actual deseg- 
regation virtually impossible to achieve and has hastened the flight of 
urban, White families to the contiguous suburbs where school districts 
have been effectively insulated by Milliken from any unwanted incur- 
sions by minorities. 
Faced with findings of constitutional violations and prevented 
from ordering the only remedy which has proven successful in signifi- 
121. Id at 246-48. 
122. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). . 
123. Id at 270-71. 
124. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
125. Id at 278. 
126. See generally Robert A. Sadler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milli- 
ken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 
WASH. U. L.Q. 535; Leonard P. Strickman, School Desegregafion at the Crossroads, 76 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 725 (1975). 
127. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
128. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
129. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 E2d 1181 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
130. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct 2038 
(1995), for the subsequent High Court ruling on this remedy. 
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cantly resolving metropolitan-wide school ~egregation,'~ district 
courts were left with no option but to order extraordinary expendi- 
tures in an attempt to make the city schools equal in quality to subur- 
ban s c h ~ o l s , l ~ ~  an ironic return to the "separate but equal" doctrine 
which had been vigorously renounced in Brown.133 Sadly, in no case 
have these massive efforts been successful in significantly raising the 
level of educational achievement for blacks and other minorities,134 
one of the major results achieved by successful metropolitan-wide de- 
segregation plans implemented throughout the S 0 ~ t h . l ~ ~  
Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's use of a 
discriminatory intentJcausation requirement in school desegregation 
cases which-in addition to other rationales often used to limit the 
reach of judicial remedies such as the de jurelde facto distinction, fed- 
eralism concerns, and respect for school district lines and local con- 
trol-has become a formidable obstacle to the invalidation of public 
policies alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.13%ost, st, not 
all, of these legal scholars have agreed that such a standard is not im- 
plied or required by the general language of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 Nor was it required under 
prior federal case law, which generally held intent to be irrelevant in 
131. See infra Part III(b) for full discussion of this point. 
132. See, e.g., Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 57. 
133. 348 U.S. 483,495 (1954). 
134. The Kansas City case is perhaps the most striking example of this phenomenon: 
many years of effort and $1.5 billion expended to create some of the nation's most splendid 
schools, produced virtually no progress in student achievement. Having set in motion a 
series of acts doomed to failure, the Supreme Court informed us just last year in Missouri 
v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995), that gains in student achievement will no longer be seen 
as a necessary test in deciding whether or not to release a district from federal court super- 
vision. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 75-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
135. See infra Part III(b) for discussion of research findings. 
136. See Gayle Binion, Intent and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration. 1983 SUP. C-r. 
REV. 397; Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Rme Has Come: Anti-discrimination 
Law in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Ch. L. REV. 742 
(1974); Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275 (1972); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: 'All-Out' 
School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Eric S. Stein, Attacking 
School Desegregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003 (1990); and LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITNTIONAL AW 1436-1672 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W]; Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro- 
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitu- 
tional Theories]; Laurence H .  Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers 
Can Learn from Modern ~ h ~ s i c s ,  103HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitu- 
tional Physics]. See generally Ortiz, supra note 114. 
137. See supra note 136. 
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equal protection cases.13* Other explanations must therefore be pro- 
vided for such a radical change in course. 
Professor Daniel Ortiz has proposed the theory that several fac- 
tors influenced the Court's new approach to equal protection under 
the Fourteenth By the early 1970s, the Court had so 
thoroughly fleshed out its "tiers of scrutiny" jurisprudence that results 
in equal protection cases had become predictab1e.l4O Once the groups 
deserving strict scrutiny had been recognized, equal protection analy- 
sis centered on identifying the group targeted by the governmental 
decision.14' This was a fairly simple task when laws discriminated on 
their face against protected groups. When government officials began 
to use "proxy" classifications-classifications such as wealth and edu- 
cation that appear facially neutral but which correlate with race and 
other protected classifications-the Court needed an intent require- 
ment to uncover these covert, proxy clqssifications to identify the 
proper level of judicial scrutiny.142 This development coincided with 
the ascendancy of process-based theories in constitutional law which 
required a showing of intentional discrimination in the decisionmak- 
ing process to justify court intervention. 
As necessary as such a doctrinal development may have been 
considered, Professor Ortiz argues that it has not served its purpose 
and is in fact applied differently depending on the type of case being 
adj~dicated. '~~ In equal protection cases involving housing and em- 
ployment, a plaintiff prevails only with absolute proof of discrimina- 
tory motive,144 an approach which protects the cohort classifications 
of wealth and education by which such benefits are traditionally allo- 
~ a t e d . ' ~ ~  In cases involving voting and jury selection, benefits not tra- 
ditionally allocated by wealth and education, discriminatory intent can 
be considered the "cause" of an adverse impact by showing the impact 
on an identifiable group combined with either the susceptibility of the 
selection process to manipulation (jury selection cases) or discrimina- 
tion in other areas of life (voting cases).146 
138. See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
139. Ortiz, supra note 114, at 11 10-19. 
140. Id at 1116-17. 
141. Id at 1117. 
142. Id at 1118. 
143. Id at 1119. 
144. Id at 1107, 1135-40. 
145. Id at 1135-40. 
146. See id. at 1119, 1126, 1135. 
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Ortiz states that in school desegregation cases, the federal dis- 
criminatory intent/causation requirement comes into play at three 
stages of litigation and is most bizarrely applied.147 At the initial lia- 
bility stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence of discriminatory in- 
tent occurring at some time between the Brown decision and the 
present day.148 Once that has been accomplished by plaintiffs-which 
is .increasingly hard to do as motivations become more and more at- 
tenuated and causal links to current segregated conditions become all 
but impossible to discern-the state can rebut such evidence only with 
a compelling justification for segregation, a standard which no state 
has ever met.14' Finally, should a plaintiff prevail in establishing lia- 
bility, the state is under an affirmative duty to achieve a unitary sys- 
tem, and its efforts in this regard are judged solely on the basis of 
effect.lS0 
Ortiz argues that the federal standard becomes even more bur- 
densome to plaintiffs after unitariness has been achieved because, 
should resegregation occur after the district court has relinquished its 
jurisdiction over the case, plaintiffs must then carry the burden of 
showing actual discriminatory motivation in the current decisionmak- 
ing proces~,'~' much as plaintiffs are required to do in housing and 
employment cases. Needless to say, this approach has not only made 
the problem of metropolitan-wide segregation very difficult to rem- 
edy, but has also made it virtually impossible to attack de facto 
resegregation in areas where the original problem had previously been 
a1leviated.ls2 
There are other problems inherent in the discriminatory intent/ 
causation approach, not the least of which is its failure to properly 
take note of the effect of unconscious racism in the decisionmaking 
process. Professor Charles Lawrence is one of many commentators 
who have written on this phenomenon: "Traditional notions of intent 
do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influ- 
enced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither in- 
tentional . . . nor unintentional. . . . [A] large part of the behavior that 
147. Id at 1135. 
148. Id 
149. Id 
150. Id 
151. Id. 
152. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), 
is exemplary in this regard. See supra note 83. 
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produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial 
motivation. 3,153 
Professor Lawrence argues that Americans share a common cul- 
tural heritage in which racism has played a dominant r01e.l~~ Out of 
this shared heritage has developed a common belief system containing 
certain "tacit understandings" of which we are largely unaware.15s 
Because these beliefs and understandings are so widespread in society 
and are rarely directly taught, we are not as likely to be conscious of 
the fact that we harbor them.lS6 Even if such beliefs do surface occa- 
sionally, they are quickly refused recognition because they conflict 
with a shared moral code which rejects such thoughts as "racist": 
In short, requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation 
as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is 
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how 
the human mind works. . . . The [Elqual [Plrotection [Cllause 
requires the elimination of governmental decisions that take 
race into account without good and important reasons. There- 
fore, equal protection doctrine must find a way to come to grips 
with unconscious racism.157 
Professor Laurence Tribe has criticized federal doctrine as ap- 
plied in school desegregation cases on the same grounds.lS8 Rather 
than contracting the judicial role in cases of de facto segregation, Pro- 
fessor Tribe believes it should be expanded, precisely because the ex- 
act motivations, purposes, intentions, and causes of such segregation 
are so difficult to discern. Professor Tribe sees little difference be- 
tween the harm which results from either de jure or de facto segrega- 
tion. He agrees that in de facto cases, discriminatory intent, which is 
likely to be more "present than provable," often results from an un- 
conscious racism which is the legacy of our segregated h i ~ t 0 r y . l ~ ~  
Tribe suggests that until this legacy recedes, "judicially compelled inte- 
gration may be the only acceptable response to the high probability of 
governmental prejudice and corruption behind all segregat i~n ."~~~ 
153. Charles R. Lawrence, 111, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317.322 (1987). 
154. Id at 322-23. 
155. Id 
156. Id at 323. 
157. Id. 
158. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU~ONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1500. 
159. Id 
160. Id. For other scholars in agreement on this point, see generally Goodman, supra 
note 136 and Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Conse- 
quences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3 (1977). 
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Many other commentators have criticized the current federal ap- 
proach on the grounds that it has developed from a form of legal anal- 
ysis which seeks to identify wrongdoers and hold them responsible for 
"causing" harm to a protected Professor Tribe has identified 
the problem as one resulting from reliance on "antidiscrimination" as 
the mediating principle underlying the Equal Protection C1au~e . l~~  
Because discrimination is defined as an "act based on prejudice,"163 
the finding of discrimination requires that we identify both an actor 
and an act based on invidious motivation. Further, because the focus 
is on the "perpetrator,"16" this leads inexorably to the state action, 
discriminatory intent, and causation standards under the Fourteenth 
Amendment currently employed by federal courts and, therefore, to 
the results in Washington v. Davis, Milliken, and other cases. 
In each case, Professor Tribe asserts, the Supreme Court has 
noted the disparate, harmful effect on the victim, and then focused on 
the discriminatory motives of the particular actor instead of the Con- 
stitution's more proper focus, i.e., the harmful impact on a protected 
g r 0 ~ p . l ~ ~  Professor Tribe suggests that at the present stage, when the 
problems have become so entrenched that intentlcausation is almost 
impossible to prove, a far better mediator for equal protection pur- 
poses would be the "antisubjugation principle, which aims [not at 
preventing discriminatory acts of wrongdoers, but rather] to break 
down legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination 
that treat some people as second-class citizens. ,3166 
Professor James Liebman raises similar concerns. He describes 
the Court's movement in desegregation cases from reliance on the 
equal educational opportunity or integration theories in the 1950s and 
1960s-which tended to focus on remedying the effects of government 
decisionmaking-to what he terms the "Correction Theory," which 
focuses on the evil acts of ~rongd0ers . l~~ The moral imperative of the 
Correction Theory is identical to that which motivates the law of torts, 
that is, a "'deep sense of common law morality that one who hurts 
161. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1501-20; OWEN M. FISS, THE Crvn. R G ~  INJUNC- 
TION passim (1978) [hereinafter FISS, CIWL RIGHTS]; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 
1978 Term: Foreword. The Forms of Justice, 93 Haw. L. Rev. 1, 1-23 (1979) [hereinafter 
Fiss, 1978 Term]. 
162. TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N ~ T I O N A L  LAW, supra note 136, at 1514. 
163. Id. at 1515. 
164. Id  
165. Id  
166. Id. See infra Part III(a) for an application of this antisubjugation principle to 
school desegregation under the Connecticut Constitution. 
167. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1501. 
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another should compensate him."'168 In the desegregation context, 
this theory translates into the "'strong moral claim that purposeful 
discrimination is a wrong whose effects must be eradi~ated.""~~ 
Professor Liebman argues that the courts have found the tort 
analogy-which fits in neatly with process-based theories-appealing 
because "it is simple, individualistic, and by hypothesis nonredistribu- 
tive."170 Ultimately, however, private law solutions to public law 
problems are inherently unsatisfying and ineffective. In particular, 
they fail to respond satisfactorily to the victims of entrenched metro- 
politan-wide school segregation and other forms of racial discrimina- 
tion for the same reasons that private tort law fails to deal 
satisfactorily with the victims of mass toxic tort disasters.17* 
Professor Liebman draws convincing analogies between the two 
cases. He argues that "[tlhe complicated character and massive scale 
of the problem in both situations cause the correctively critical prereq- 
uisites of an identifiable plaintiff and an identifiable defendant to 
elude proof, notwithstanding that unjustly enriched wrongdoers al- 
most certainly have visited harms on large numbers of victims."172 As 
a result, in both the mass toxic tort and school segregation contexts, 
the supposed moral integrity of the compensatory system 
Tort scholars have drawn attention to the problems of victims of 
cancer who can prove beyond doubt their exposure to a toxic agent 
that is known to increase the incidence of cancer in the population but 
which may be only one of many "causes" of the victims' cancers.174 
Typically, these plaintiffs can also show that the agent was produced at 
a given time by one or several chemical companies, but cannot prove 
which companies. Professor Liebman argues that the case of residen- 
tially and educationally segregated minority children is similar, in that 
they can show "exposure" to myriad acts of school, housing and other 
government officials, any one of which, in addition to a number of so- 
called "neutral factors,"175 may have resulted in their attendance in 
168. Id (quoting Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 
1401, 1412 (1961)). 
169. Id. (quoting Paul Gewirtz. Choice in the Transition. School Desegregation and the 
Correclive Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 729 (1986)). 
170. Id. at 1502 (citations omitted). 
171. Id. at 1518-19. 
172. Id at 1519. 
173. Id 
174. See, e.g., PETER H .  SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS 
IN THE COURTS 3-15 (1986). 
175. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1519. 
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segregated schools, but they cannot pinpoint which factor or actor 
may have "caused" their harm. Liebman sees the problem in both 
cases as being the near impossibility of proving "specific causation of 
injuries that regrettably, are not substance- or discrirnination- 
specific."l-16 
- 
Professor Liebman concludes that rather than resolving the 
problems suffered by victims in both cases, the traditional tort ap- 
proach merely allows a court to engage in "an ostrich-like avoidance 
of them."l-I7 He favors the abandonment of the Correction Theory in 
federal equal protection j~r isprudence,~~~ but, curiously, argues for 
the retention of some form of the intent standard, even though he 
admits that to do so makes the problem of metropolitan-wide segrega- 
tion nearly impossible to res01ve.l~~ 
Many commentators agree that it would be better by far to aban- 
don the tort model completely since it has failed to eliminate a soci- 
ety-wide harm in any but the most ad hoc and arbitrary fashion. 
Under the current federal approach, the Court appears to be saying to 
plaintiffs, "if you can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
given actor's discriminatory animus during the decisionmaking pro- 
cess caused the harm you are currently suffering, in an era in which a 
reluctant society is ever more skillful at disguising such animus and 
obliterating the causal links, then we will use the full force of declara- 
tory and injunctive relief-to remedy your suffering. If you fail to sur- 
mount this burden, however, we must turn a blind eye to your 
suffering." This is exactly the approach taken by the lower court in 
Sheff. 
Professor Tribe has offered compelling criticism of this particular 
result of the current federal approach: "A corollary of responsible 
modernism is to admit that we can see more than we can do. But this 
does not mean that we should lie about what we see."lS0 He argues 
that by utilizing a reference point of detached neutrality to selectively 
reach into society, make a few fine-tuning adjustments, and step back 
out, the federal courts are ignoring the lesson of modern quantum 
mechanics which tells us that the act of observing always affects what 
is being observed, and that the observer is never really "detached" 
from the system being studied.181 "The results courts announce-the 
176. I d  (internal quotations omitted). 
177. I d  at 1521 (quoting SCHUCK, supra note 174, at 267-68). 
178. I d  at 1523. 
179. Id  at 1663. 
180. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 38. 
181. Id. at 13, 20. 
Heinonline - -  23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 378 1995-1996 
Winter 19961 STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 379 
ways they view the legal terrain and what they say about it-will in 
turn have continuing effects that reshape the nature of what the courts 
initially undertook to review . . . . 7,182 
Professor Tribe points out that the current perception that "white 
flight" is the result of purely private choices by individuals, and there- 
fore beyond the power of courts to remedy, has resulted from a series 
of Supreme Court decisions which, until recently in Freeman v. Pitts, 
did not purport to establish such a principle.183 Taken together, Tribe 
suggests that Pierce v. Society of Sisters,lS4 Swann, Milliken, and even 
Brown (due to its original focus on the school district rather than the 
state as the responsible party), say in effect that White parents have 
the "'inherent right' to keep [their] children in [white, affluent 
schools by moving to a suburban school Professor Fiss has 
also recognized that the clear, legitimating message of a state's rigid 
adherence to geographic criteria for school attendance is to say to the 
parents who do not want their children to attend an integrated school, 
"this desire can be fulfilled by moving to a CW]hite neighborhood."ls6 
Tribe criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken as a fail- 
ure to create a rightslremedy dialogue which might have eventually 
located a solution to the problem of metropolitan-side segregation.lS7 
Counselling abandonment of the current federal approach to equal 
protection in general, and school desegregation cases in particular, 
Professor Tribe reminds us that even so-called neutral acts can have 
"racially separationist  consequence^."^^^ A finding of governmental 
responsibility for these consequences does not require a court to un- 
cover the hidden motives behind governmental action. Instead, courts 
should look clearly at "the world government has and recog- 
nize that for some citizens, the equal chance to succeed in that world 
has been severely compromised by the structure that government, 
perhaps unwittingly, has devised.lgO 
182. Id. at 20. Professor Fiss has also observed the power of a court's response in 
school desegregation cases to reshape both the legal and societal landscape: "The moral 
status of a claim may derive from its legal recognition: morality shaped the judgment in 
Brown v, Board of Education and that judgment then shaped our morality." FISS, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, supra note 161, at 95. 
183. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 27. 
184. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
185. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 28. 
186. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 587-88. 
187. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 30 (citations omitted). 
188. Id. at 33 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). See also Fiss, Constitu- 
tional Concepts, supra note 110, at 585-87. 
189. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 39. 
190. Id 
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Professor Tribe agrees with commentators such as Lawrence 
Sager, who suggest that when federal courts announce that the state 
cannot be held responsible for correcting hannful conditions it has not 
intended or caused, they legitimate both the acts of government and 
their harmful effects.lgl This, in turn, relieves other potential actors of 
the responsibility for resolving the problem.lg2 A far better outcome 
would be a federal court's admission that a protected group has been 
impermissibly harmed but that the district court has no way to remedy 
it, rather than to say no harm has been done, or that the government 
is not responsible for finding a remedy.lg3 This would leave the way 
clear, as Professor Fiss reminds us, for state governments, local school 
boards and other agencies-even the Congress of the United States- 
to pass laws requiring or inducing states and their local districts to 
take steps to eliminate segregation.lg4 Both Professor Fiss and Profes- 
sor Tribe argue for a theory of government responsibility based on the 
government's ability to avoid harmful effects rather than on its intent 
to cause such effects. Professor Tribe suggests: 
We may all be engulfed by, and dependent upon, the structure 
of the law, but we are not all rendered equally vulnerable by it. 
If the special dependence upon the law and its omissions that is 
experienced by the most vulnerable among us could be dis- 
missed as irrelevant because it was not directly created by any 
state force targeting such individuals, their heightened depen- 
dence might be seen as legally immaterial. But if the systemic 
vulnerability of some . . . is instead regarded as centrally rele- 
vant to how the law's shape should be understood, then one is 
more likely at least to ask whether the legal system's very failure 
to do more for such persons might not work an unconstitutional 
deprivation of their rights.lg5 
State courts need not be held hostage to a federal model which 
has failed to provide many of their most vulnerable citizens with an 
adequate basis for an autonomous and successful life. In She# the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, independently construing its own equal 
protection provisions and pursuing its own constitutional values, 
should abandon the failed federal model in school desegregation cases 
in toto and at last put flesh on the bare bones of Connecticut's de- 
clared fundamental right to an equal educational opportunity. 
191. Id at 33-34 (citing Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under- 
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978)). 
192. Id 
193. Fiss, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra note 96, at 708. 
194. Id 
195. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 13 (emphasis added). 
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IIb. The Fundamental Differences between Federal and State 
Constitutional Adjudication 
The federal courts comprise a crucial bulwark against evulsive 
depredation of constitutional values. but against scattered ero- 
sion they are relatively powerless.196 
Like Professor Lawrence Sager, other commentators have ob- 
served that, while federal courts have been effective against overt 
apartheid, such as Jim Crow laws and "White's only" signs, "[tlhe con- 
temporary symptoms of inertial and unconscious prejudice are more 
subtle"lg7 and have proven much more difficult to eradicate. How- 
ever, the limitations-some institutional, some doctrinally self-im- 
posed-which have hampered the federal courts' remedial efforts in 
this arena do not apply to state courts and therefore should not stop 
them from articulating a more effective approach. 
The current trend of independent state constitutional interpreta- 
tions, which extend protections beyond those offered under the Four- 
teenth Amendment, has led to a growing perception among judges 
and legal scholars that federal Supreme Court decisions, which we 
have tended to consider as the end-point of the constitutional deci- 
sionrnaking process, represent instead the mid-point of an evolving 
system.lg8 In this system, if the Court strikes down the state action, it 
sets a federal minimum.199 But if it upholds the state action, the deci- 
sion may precipitate a series of "second-looks" by state deci- 
sionrnakers in which Supreme Court decisions no longer carry 
presumptive validity.200 As Professor Kahn notes, "the mere fact that 
a doctrine emerges from the authoritative voice of the Supreme Court 
does not make it correct. . . . In this debate over the meaning and 
requirements of law, the Court's voice is never final."201 There is now 
an extensive literature favoring this trend, as well as many state and 
federal decisions which attest to its validity. One reason for this 
evolving pattern is that state courts are not bound by the same implicit 
or explicit institutional limitations which often form the basis of a fed- 
eral decision. 
196. Sager. supra note 191, at 1263. 
197. See, eg., TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N S T I ~ O N A L  LAW, supra note 136, at 1513-14. 
198. Robert E Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection 
of the Supreme Court's Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353,360 (1984). See also 
Brennan, supra note 17; Stanley Mosk, The State Courts, in AMERICAN LAW: THE THIRD 
CENTURY 213,220-25 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1976). 
199. Williams, supra note 198, at 361. 
200. Id 
201. Kahn, supra note 19, at 1155. 
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A. The Limitations of Federalism 
The first of these limitations is the Court's concern for federalism, 
especially in equal protection cases. Professor Tribe believes that the 
Supreme Court's deep reservations about the efficacy and legitimacy 
of intrusive federal injunctive remedies lie at the base of its decisions 
which involve a discriminatory intentlcausation requirement?02 
Often, plaintiffs have sought remedies which, in the Court's view, 
would have involved the federal courts too deeply in state or local 
matters. This is an institutional concern that is serious and legitimate 
but which does not excuse the Court from ignoring the underlying 
problem by imposing a threshold test?03 Rather than deciding that no 
constitutional violation can be shown without evidence of discrirnina- 
tory intent,204 Professor Tribe argues that the federal courts should say 
"[tlhere is a violation here but institutional considerations prevent us 
from providing a remedy."205 
The significance of this very different message is that the problem 
is then passed on for resolution to other branches of government 
which are equally obliged to uphold constitutional values. State gov- 
ernmental entities are not restrained by principles such as federalism 
that might limit the power of the federal courts to act in a particular 
instance?06 In particular, state courts may play a role, vis-a-vis the 
other branches of state government, that differs markedly from the 
limited "interstitial" role of the federal courts.207 Presumably, Profes- 
sor Tribe would approve of the Supreme Court's decision in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezzog which, while de- 
nying a basis for a fundamental right to education under the United 
States Constitution, clearly stated that their decision was not to be 
viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status thus im- 
plicitly inviting state courts to resolve the issue without being bur- 
dened by federalist concerns. 
This invitation was understood perfectly by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in finding a fundamental right to an equal educational 
opportunity under the Connecticut Constitution in H0rton.2'~ As 
202. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST~TIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1510-12. 
203. I d  at 1512. 
204. I d  
205. I d  at 1513. 
206. I d  
207. I d  
208. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
209. Id. at 58. 
210. 376 A.2d 359,371 (Conn. 1977). 
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Chief Justice Peters, dissenting in Pellegrino v. 0'Neill,211 explained: 
"We are free to consider this matter unencumbered by the considera- 
tions of federalism which have led federal courts to doubt the propri- 
ety of federal intervention in the administration of state judicial 
systems. m212 
B. The State Action Requirement 
A second limitation on federal constitutional analysis is the state 
action requirement which federal courts have derived from the "No 
state shall . . ." language of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition 
to the obvious lack of any such limiting, state-specific language in 
either of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Connecticut Constitu- 
tion,2I3 there is an even more fundamental reason for not importing a 
state action requirement into state constitutional decisionmaking: the 
purpose served by that requirement in interpreting the Federal Con- 
stitution does not exist in the state context. 
The original purpose of the state action requirement was to shield 
some portion of state sovereignty from the broad reach of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. Professor Martin Margulies sees the requirement 
of state action as a shorthand expression used by federal courts in 
balancing the interests of a complainant against those of an alleged 
wrongdoer, while showing due deference to the interest of the state 
"in resolving the conflict without federal interference. "214 This state 
interest factor is missing in state court adjudication. 
Chief Justice Peters, dissenting in Cologne v. Westfarms Associ- 
ates,215 argued that the state action requirement was designed by the 
federal courts to address the demands of federalism by creating space 
for state regulation.216 According to Chief Justice Peters, there is no 
basis for a state action requirement under state constitutions because 
this "federalism component" is missing.217 However, she asserts that 
if the state courts should decide to devise a state action requirement 
independently, it should be applied more flexibly than under federal 
law and be "more readily found for a claim of racial discrimina- 
211. 480 A.2d 476 (Conn. 1984). 
212. Id at 488. 
213. See supra note 66. 
214. Martin B. Margulies, A Lawyer's View of the Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 107, 
111 (1982). 
215. 469 A.2d 1201,1210 (Conn. 1984). 
216. Id. at 1218 (citing Tribe, Constitutional Theories, supra note 136, at 1149-50). 
217. 469 A.2d at 1218. 
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t i ~ n . " ~ l ~  In reaching her conclusions, Chief Justice Peters drew on 
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Cente?lg and several decisions by 
other that refused to impose a state action requirement on 
state constitutional decisionmaking. 
Therefore, when the She8 defendants assert that the plaintiffs 
cannot proceed without first satisfying the state action requirement, 
they are invoking a federal doctrine devised by federal courts for fed- 
eral purposes under the Fourteenth Amendment. Technically, there is 
no state action requirement under any state constitution. 
In Connecticut, this last assertion could be based solely on the 
different language of the federal and state provisions, a difference 
which many state courts have used persuasively to avoid implying a 
state action requirement into state constitutional adjudication. But 
even if the language of the state and federal provisions were exactly 
the same, many scholars and jurists would agree that there would be 
no inherent reason for state courts to read that language as requiring 
the same interpretation that their federal counterparts have given 
it.=' AS Justice Berdon of the Connecticut Supreme Court has ob- 
served, "even when state and federal provisions have identical lan- 
guage, the state charter may require more p r o t e c t i ~ n . " ~ ~  
An increasing number of state courts have construed state consti- 
tutions and state bills of rights as guaranteeing more protection than 
the federal provisions, even if identical in wording. Justice Brennan 
cites several cases in New Jersey, Hawaii, Michigan, South Dakota, 
Maine, and other states as examples of this p h e n o m e n ~ n . ~ ~  In partic- 
ular, he refers to these words of the California Supreme Court: 
We . . . declare that [the decision to the contrary of the United 
States Supreme Court] is not persuasive authority in any state 
prosecution in California . . . . We pause . . . to reaffirm the 
independent nature of the California Constitution and our re- 
sponsibility to separately define and protect the rights of Cali- 
fornia citizens, despite conflicting decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court interpreting the Federal ~ons t i tu t ion .~~  
218. Id 
219. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
220. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores 
Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983). 
221. Williams, supra note 198, at 389-90; Brennan, supra note 17, at 495. 
222. Berdon, supra note 28, at 205-206. See also Peters, supra note 72, at 585. See, e.g., 
People v. Young, 814 P2d 834,846 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (declaring death penalty statute 
facially invalid under state Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, despite fact that it was 
identical to its federal counterpart). 
223. Brennan, supra note 17, at 499-501. 
224. People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272,280-81 (Cal. 1976). 
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Nor are United States Supreme Court statements, such as those 
in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Cer~ter ,2~~ that state courts are free 
to interpret their constitutions to expand constitutional rights as they 
see fit, the source of state power in this regard. It is now widely ac- 
cepted that a state constitution is an independent source of rights, to 
be interpreted on its own termsz6 Chief Justice Peters has asserted 
that "[ulnder our federal system of dual sovereignty, state constitu- 
tions embody the reservation to the states of all residual power not . . . 
conferred upon the federal government. State courts therefore must 
be empowered to determine, in light of state interests and state his- 
tory, what meaning to attribute to provisions contained in state 
constitutions. ,9227 
Not only are federal court decisions not the source of a state's 
power to interpret its own constitution, but the notion that state con- 
stitutional provisions were intended to mirror the federal provisions 
does not comport with history. A historical analysis of the federal Bill 
of Rights reveals that the drafters drew from provisions of the already 
existing state  constitution^.^^ Additionally, the bills of rights of the 
various states continued to play the crucial role in limiting govern- 
mental abuse even after the federal constitution was written because, 
until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal Bill of 
Rights was held to be inapplicable to the states.ug Therefore, as Jus- 
tice Brennan noted, Supreme Court decisions "are not, and should not 
be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counter- 
part provisions of state law. ,9230 
In sum, the institutional limitations on federal courts that pro- 
duced the state action requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment 
provide Connecticut courts with ample reasons to reject the use of a 
225. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
226. The majority opinion in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 469 A.2d 1201, 1206 
(Conn. 1984), reaffirms this principle for Connecticut by relying on State v. Ferrell, 463 
A.2d 573, 578 n.12 (Conn. 1983). Griswold Inn, Znc. v. State, 441 A.2d 16, 20 n.3 (Conn. 
1981). Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553,554 (cbnn. 1977), and Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 
359,371 (Conn. 1977). 
227. Peters, supra note 72, at 588. See also Berdon, supra note 28, at 206; Kauger, supra 
note 18, at 17 (citing Turner v. City of Lawton, 733 P.2d 375,378-79 (Okla. 1986)); Peters, 
Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 23. See generally Brennan, supra note 17; Kahn, 
supra note 19; and Robert A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483 (1994). 
228, See Robert F. Williams, Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The State Constitu- 
tional Experience of the Framers of ;he Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 
403-04 (1988). 
229. Brennan, supra note 17, at 502. 
230. Id. See generally WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., The Bill of Rights and the States, in 
THE GREAT RIGHTS 65 (Edmond N. Cahn ed., 1963). 
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state action requirement in Connecticut equal protection cases, the 
most fundamental being that a state action requirement has no basis 
in the substantive Connecticut constitutional guarantee of equality. 
C. Institutional and Functional Differences 
Federal doctrine is also dictated in part by other institutional limi- 
tations which do not hamper state courts. First, United States 
Supreme Court decisions must operate in all areas of the nation and 
must, therefore, represent the lowest common denominator of rights 
protection. Second, the doctrine of selective incorporation used for 
applying the Bill of Rights to the states leads to questions regarding 
the dilution of those rights in a state context.231 Third, as Justice 
Breman observed, "state courts that rest their decisions wholly or 
even partly on state law need not apply federal principles of standing 
and justiciability that deny litigants access to the 
Furthermore, some commentators have noted significant func- 
tional differences between federal and state courts which militate 
against the adoption of a federal approach to state constitutional 
questions. First, state courts are often deeply involved in the state 
policymaking process, which implies a very different institutional posi- 
tion from that of the United States Supreme Court. Legislators and 
state judges are, in a very real sense, "partners in the business of plan- 
ning for the welfare of the state."u3 Second, a state court's judicial 
function is often quite different. State courts perform a great deal of 
nonconstitutional lawmaking, a power which federal courts have been 
denied since Erie Railroad Co. v. T ~ r n p k i n s . ~ ~ ~  As Professor Robert 
Williams has observed, state supreme courts can effectively make law 
through their rulemaking powers, as well as exercising a variety of 
"inherent powers" unknown by their federal counterparts.235 
Chief Justice Peters has also stressed the significant differences 
between the pursuit of constitutional business in the Supreme Court 
in Washington and the high courts of the various states. For example, 
federal and state courts do not share the same constitutional heritage 
nor do they rely on the same methodology to reach their constitu- 
tional decisions. In addition, to a far greater degree than federal 
judges, state court judges are publicly accountable for their decisions 
231. Williams, supra note 198, at 389-91. 
232. Brennan, supra note 17, at 501. 
233. Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 22. 
234. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
235. Williams, supra note 198, at 399. 
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because they are not appointed for life, either being elected by state 
citizens or appointed to their terms in office with the approval of the 
1egislatu1-e.236 This greater publicaccountability could be said to give 
state courts greater weight as democratic institutions than their fed- 
eral counterparts. 
In addition to the fact that state constitutional provisions may dif- 
fer qualitatively from their federal counterparts, other "nonrights" 
provisions of state constitutions may differ from provisions of the fed- 
eral constitution so greatly as to profoundly change the balance of 
power in state government. For example, many state constitutions 
contain provisions enlarging judicial authority at the expense of the 
legi~lature.2~~ Also, the text of a state constitution may explicitly pro- 
vide for judicial review of legislative and executive actionu8 In fact, 
judicial review was a phenomenon of state law long before Marbury v. 
and contrary to the federal experience, most judiciary 
provisions of state constitutions have been revised and ratified in this 
century without a serious struggle over the exercise of judicial 
re~iew.2~" 
Because of these institutional and functional differences, and nu- 
merous 0thers,2~' the judicial review exercised by a state court should 
be qualitatively and doctrinally different from that which would be 
exercised by a federal court. This is particularly true in school deseg- 
regation cases where the federal approach has failed to remedy so fun- 
damental a societal problem as metropolitan-wide school segregation. 
Viewing United States Supreme Court decisions as presumptively 
valid for state constitutional analysis-the view apparently held by the 
lower court in Sheff and expressed in many of the older state cases 
when parallel decisionmaking under provisions of both the federal 
and state constitutions was the norm-denigrates the importance of 
state constitutional jurisprudence. Efforts to limit state decisionrnak- 
236. Peters, Evolving Federal System, supra note 32, at 21-22. 
237. Williams, supra note 198, at 401. 
238. The Framers of many of the state constitutions intended judicial review to play a 
more significant role than did the Framers of the federal constitution. See Feldman, supra 
note 68, at 1062. See generally William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Re- 
view, The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U .  PA. L. REV. 
1166, 1167 (1972). States continued to see judicial review as a critical state court function 
in order to check the powers of state legislatures as part of the Jacksonian era's impetus 
toward reform. See James A. Henretta, Foreword. Rethinking the State Constitutional Tra- 
dition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819,833-35 (1991). 
239. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
240. See Williams, supra note 198, at 401. See also Feldman, supra note 68, at 1062. 
241. Further differences are noted in Williams, supra note 198, at 397-404. 
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ing by analytical formulations and doctrines designed to serve the pur- 
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal judicial system 
constitute an unwarranted delegation of state power to the federal 
courts. Moreover, they result in an abdication of state judicial respon- 
sibility to provide for some of its most vulnerable citizens "the full 
panoply of rights which Connecticut residents have come to expect as 
their 
ma. Developing an Independent Approach to State 
Constitutional Decisionmaking 
Through a series of events and doctrinal missteps, federal school 
desegregation law has moved away from the early promises of 
and S ~ a n n , 2 ~ ~  which held the segregated condi- 
tion of schools to be an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protec- 
tion, and toward a process-oriented jurisprudence which has made 
solving the unique problems posed by metropolitan-wide school seg- 
regation progressively more difficult through its use of the discrirnina- 
tory intent barrier. 
It would be possible, of course, for a state court to avoid the full 
chilling effect of this approach by carving out a narrow path through 
the federal jurisprudential wilderness, as was done by some district 
courts following Swann. This path could be constructed by adopting a 
doctrine of state responsibility based on the foreseeable segregative 
consequences of state The same result could be achieved by 
enlarging the categories of evidence deemed relevant in establishing 
intentlcausation to include "root" evidence, such as community atti- 
tudes and their effect on elected officials, and/or "branch" evidence, 
such as the decisions of other branches of state government which 
have played a part in creating or maintaining a segregated system in 
242. Horton, 376 A.2d 359,371 (Conn. 1977). 
243. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
244. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
245. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
246. See Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 584-85 (arguing that a deliber- 
ate choice of geographic criteria with knowledge of the probable consequences, combined 
with a deliberate "decision not to mitigate the consequences of a prior choice reinforces 
the ascription of responsibility") and Robert I. Richter, Note, School Desegregation After 
Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHI.  L. REV. 421,424-29 (arguing 
that segregative intent can easily be shown in facially neutral acts, such as attendance zone 
designation or school site location, which have the natural and probable effect of fostering 
residential segregation and which may subsequently result in racially imbalanced schools). 
See generally Binion, supra note 136; Goodman, supra note 136; Liebman, supra note 136. 
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both schools and The path could also be constructed by 
shifting the burden of proof on intentlcausation to defendants once 
racial isolation has been established by objective criteria, the ap- 
proach taken by the Supreme Court in S ~ a n n . 2 ~ ~  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court took a similar burden-shifting approach in H0rton.2~~ 
One might also argue that current federal doctrine permits the 
narrow approaches described above, based on the language in Colum- 
bus Board of Education v. Peni~k.~~O Penick blurred the de factolde 
jure distinction by suggesting that, even in a city like Columbus which 
had no statutorily mandated segregation in this century, disparate ra- 
cial impact and foreseeable consequences could be "fertile ground for 
drawing inferences of segregative intent," even though they "without 
more, do not establish a constitutional violation."251 
Even under federal law, the argument has been made that the 
considerations often cited by federal courts as justifying a refusal to 
recognize an affirmative constitutional duty to act, such as the nega- 
tive constitutional language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state 
action requirement, a concern for federalism, and the problem of de- 
signing enforceable remedies-do not apply once the state has under- 
taken to a ~ t . 2 ~ ~  This is especially true in the state constitutional 
context where many of the constitutional guarantees protect positive 
rights, such as the right to an education, which can only be enforced 
by legislative action.253 
All of these options are available to state courts seeking to cir- 
cumvent federal standards. However, constructing such a pathway 
under state law would be a mistake. Instead, since it seems clear that 
no objective standard can be devised that will effectively and fairly 
determine whether the governmental decisionmaking process had be- 
247. See Stein, supra note 136, at 2005; TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra 
note 136, at 1500. This was the approach taken by the federal district court in Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,754 (1974). 
248. 402 U.S. 1 (1979). 
249. 486 A.2d 1099.1110 (Conn. 1985). 
250. 443 U.S. 449 (1979). 
251. Id at 464-65. 
252. See Goodman, supra note 136, at 357. 
253. Feldman has defined a "positive" constitutional right as one which can only be 
effectuated through governmental action, whereas a "negative" right is one which can only 
be realized when the government does not act. Feldman, supra note 68, at 1057,1057 n.2 
(emphasis added) (citing Burt Neuborne, Foreword. State Constitutions and the Evolution 
of Positive Righcs, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881,883 n.12 (1989)). Most of the constitutional rights 
protected under the federal Constitution are negative rights (freedom of speech, religion, 
etc.) as opposed to state constitutions which enumerate many positive state rights for state 
citizens. Id 
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come tainted by discriminatory  motivation^,^^ the federal approach 
should be rejected completely. State courts in general, and the Con- 
necticut Supreme Court in particular in Sheff, should carve out a dis- 
tinctive jurisprudence based solely on the original ;nderstanding of 
Brown and all school desegregation cases prior to Keyes, i.e. that it is 
the segregated condition of the schools, and the known hannful ef- 
fects of such conditions on the lives of children and their communities, 
that constitutes the wrong which must be remedied. 
A. The Need for Structural Reform 
A state court engaged in independent state constitutional deci- 
sionmaking should take note that the goal of school desegregation is 
structural reform. According to Professor Fiss, 
[S]tructural reform is premised on the notion that the quality of 
our social life is affected in important ways by the operation of 
large scale organizations . . . . The structural suit is one in which 
a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitu- 
tional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to 
eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institu- 
tional  arrangement^.^^ 
The question in such cases is not whether the discriminatory acts or 
motivations of state officials have "caused" a particular social condi- 
tion to exist. In a structural lawsuit, the need to identify such "wrong- 
doers" virtually disappears.256 Rather, courts must ask whether the 
condition itself threatens important constitutional values and whether 
an "organizational dynamic" exists that serves to perpetuate that con- 
d i t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  If the answers to these judicial inquiries are affirmative, the 
cost of reformation can legitimately be placed on the organization. As 
Professor Fiss has noted, this assignment of governmental responsibil- 
ity is not based on the fact that the organization has "'done wrong' in 
either the literal or metaphysical sense" but rather on the realization 
that only through structural reform can the "threat to constitutional 
values posed by the operation of the organization be removed."258 An 
understanding of the need for structural reform in achieving equal ed- 
ucational opportunity, as well as the usefulness of the structural in- 
junction in reforming the operations of a given bureaucratic 
254. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 575. 
255. Fiss, I978 Term, supra note 161, at 2. 
256. Id. at 22. 
257. Id at 18. 
258. Id at 23. 
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institution, was expressed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Hor- 
ton v. Meskill: 
Our own cases have similarly acknowledged that a court, in the 
exercise of its discretion to frame injunctive relief, must "bal- 
ance the competing interests of the parties" to assure that the 
relief it grants is compatible with the equities of the case, and 
takes account of the ossibility of embarrassment to the opera- 
tions of government. 2P9 
A school desegregation case is a paradigmatic structural lawsuit 
in which the segregated condition of the schools is alleged to violate 
the constitutional right of students to equal protection of the laws. 
The appropriate remedy in such a case is the structural injunction. As 
opposed to preventive or reparative injunctions, the structural injunc- 
tion is used to effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social insti- 
t~ t ion .~~O In a structural injunction context, like a school 
desegregation case, it is imperative to see that "[tlhe constitutional 
wrong is the structure itself; the reorganization is designed to bring 
the structure within constitutional bounds. . . ."261 
B. The Need for an Effects-Based Jurisprudence 
In a school desegregation case, the court's focus must turn away 
from the process by which schools become segregated, toward the seg- 
regated condition itself, and the effects of that condition on the lives 
of school children, their families, and their communities. This is, in 
fact, the constitutional wrong to be remedied because it is the effects 
of racial isolation which constitute a per se deprivation of equal pro- 
tection and equal educational opportunity. 
Under the structural approach advocated by Professor Fiss and 
other scholars, government responsibility attaches regardless of intent 
or causation when the state fails to remedy the racial imbalance within 
its power to avoid. Since the state, in the form of its many intercon- 
nected governmental units, has complete control over all aspects of 
public education, including the establishment of local school districts 
and compulsory attendance rules, the designation of attendance 
zones, the creation of student assignment plans, and the development 
of school funding schemes, it seems facetious to suggest that the state 
cannot be held accountable for the cumulative impact of these deci- 
259. 486 A.2d 1099, 1111 (Conn. 1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
260. Fiss, I978 Term, supra note 161, at 23-24. 
261. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS I N J U N ~ O N  11 (1978). 
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sions if they result in segregated conditions which the state has within 
its power to c0rrect.2~~ 
Feldman has noted that the enforcement of positive state consti- 
tutional guarantees calls for primary attention to be placed on the 
benefits of government action. The proper inquiry is "What can the 
state do to solve the problem?" rather than "What has the state done 
to cause the problem?"263 State courts are particularly well-suited to 
enforce these positive constitutional guarantees because of their ex- 
pertise in shaping the common law, their ability to account for unique 
local circumstances, and the "democratic imprimatur" enjoyed by 
state judges because of their special position of public 
acco~ntability.2~~ 
Professor Tribe has strongly recommended such an effects-based 
approach and has advocated a new mediating principle which better 
comports with the underlying goal of equal pr0tection.2~~ As dis- 
cussed above in Part II(a), Professor Tribe contends that the antidis- 
crimination principle, which has been used as an equal protection 
mediator for many years in school desegregation cases, requires a 
"perpetrator" who engages in the invidious act of discriminating.266 
This requirement leads inexorably to a jurisprudence based on state 
action, discriminatory intent and causation, and the subsequent "trav- 
esty" of Milliken. Professor Tribe suggests that, at the present stage, a 
far better mediating principle for equal protection cases would be the 
antisubjugation principle, which aims not at preventing discriminatory 
acts, but rather at breaking down legally reinforced systems of subor- 
dination that treat some people as second-class citizens. "The core 
value of this principle is that all people have equal which 
comes much closer to the core value underlying the principle of equal 
protection. Surely, it cannot be said that the original purpose of an 
equal protection clause, either at the federal or state level, was to un- 
cover "impure t h o u g h t ~ " ~ ~ ~  and pursue them. Rather, it seems clear 
that such clauses were intended to prevent the systematized subordi- 
nation of any group of citizens and to "guarantee a full measure of 
262. See Richter, supra note 246, at 440; Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 
587. 
263. Feldman, supra note 68, at 1089 ("[Wlhen positive rights are at issue legislative 
action represents the good and legislative inertia the evil."). 
264. Neuborne, supra note 253, at 893-900. 
265. See supra notes 162-166 and accompanying text. 
266. TRIBE, AMERICAN C O N ~ T I O N A L  LAW, supra note 136, at 1515. 
267. Id 
268. Id 
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human dignity for all."269 Under the antisubjugation principle, an 
equal protection clause asks whether the particular conditions com- 
plained of deprive a particular group of its right to be fully hu1nan.2~~ 
Professor Tribe observes further that the 
antidiscrimination principle may be sufficient to contend with 
the deprivations of equal protection that result from "isolated 
instances of overt impropriety" or "transitory hysteria." But the 
subjugation of blacks, women, and other groups that persists to- 
day is usually neither isolated nor hysterical. . . . Regimes of 
sustained subordination [ I  generate "devices, institutions, and 
circumstances that impose burdens or constraints on the target 
group without resort to repeated or individualized discrimina- 
tory actions."271 
The inequities that persist in American society have survived be- 
cause they have become ingrained in our modes of thinking?" As the 
United States Supreme Court recognized a century ago in Strauder v. 
West Virgir~ia,2~~ habitual discrimination is the hardest to eradicate. 
- 
Many commentaries have harshly criticized the United States 
Supreme Court's current process-oriented approach to equal protec- 
tion because state officials cannot be held responsible for correcting 
conditions which violate the constitutional norm of equality unless 
they have engaged in a course of conduct with the intent to discrimi- 
nate against an identifiable This approach turns a blind eye 
toward the harm which can be caused to members of certain groups 
when government actors are merely "indifferent to their suffering. ,7275 
Fiss has described the same phenomenon as the "policy of disre- 
gard."276 Current federal equal protection doctrine merely serves to 
legitimate and perpetuate this disregard and is "utterly alien to the 
basic concept of equal justice under the law."277 
C. The Antisubjugation Principle Applied to She8 
The use of the antisubjugation principle as an equal protection 
mediator allows a court to focus on the denial of humanity which the 
269. Id 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 1518 (quoting Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 828, 834 (1983)). 
272. JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 60-66 (1970). 
273. 100 U.S. 303,306 (1880). 
274. See supra note 136. 
275. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,supra note 136, at 1518-19. 
276. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 565. 
277. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L W, supra note 136, at 1519. 
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state has allowed to exist for certain of its citizensF8 Using the Sheff 
case as an example, the antisubjugation principle implies that by fo- 
cusing on the condition of segregation existing in the schools of the 
Hartford metropolitan area, and by declaring outright, as the Brown 
Court did, that subjecting children to these inherently unequal condi- 
tions constitutes a per se violation of their fundamental right to an 
equal educational opportunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court could 
more fully realize the goal of equal protection within the framework 
of Connecticut's constitutional values. 
Such an approach may, at the present time, be beyond the reach 
of the federal courts. However, it is fully supported and arguably re- 
quired by the express language of Article I, Section 20 of the Connect- 
icut Constitution, which states in part that "No person shall be denied 
the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or dis- 
crimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political 
rights."27g 
Under the standard rules of constitutional interpretation, the 
word "subjected" must be construed as having some meaning and 
should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, unless a special mean- 
ing was clearly intended by the drafters. The ordinary meanings of 
"subjected," when used as a verb and particularly when followed by 
"to," as it is in Section 20, are: "to bring under domination, control, or 
influence; to cause to undergo or to expose to something specified; to 
make liable or vulnerable; to lay open or expose."280 Interestingly, in 
light of the antisubjugation principle discussed above, the ordinary 
meanings of the word "subjugate" are: "to bring under complete con- 
trol or subjection; to conquer, to master; to make submissive or sub- 
servient; to enslave. The importance of the definitional 
interrelationship between the two terms "subjugation" and "subjec- 
tion" cannot be overlooked in the construction of the phrase, "be sub- 
jected to" in Article I, Section 20. 
In addition to the plain meaning rule, Connecticut courts have 
ascribed to the fundamental tenet of constitutional construction which 
directs that a constitutional provision should be construed to give the 
provision effective operation and to suppress the mischief at which it 
278. Whereas the antidiscrimination principle [and the discriminatory intentlcausation 
requirement which it has spawned] look[] inward to the perpetrator's state o'f mind, the 
antisubjugation principle looks outward to the victim's state of existence. Id. 
279. CONN. CONST. art. I, 8 20 (emphasis added). 
280. THE RANDOM HOUSE D I ~ O N A R Y  OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1893 (2d ed. 
1987). 
281. Id. (emphasis added). 
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was aimed.282 The insertion by the drafters of very particularized lan- 
guage into the second Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut 
Constitution in 1965, in full awareness of the major expansion of polit. 
ical and civil rights then occurring, must have been aimed at sup- 
pressing the mischief of the continued subjugation of African- 
Americans and other target groups in Connecticut. To follow the 
words "subjected to" with words as uncompromisingly negative as 
"segregation" and "discrimination" clearly indicates that the drafters 
did not intend "subjected to" to carry the sunnier meaning of "to 
bring under dominion," but rather to carry the full negative burden of 
the phrase-that is, to expose, to make vulnerable, to subjugate, to 
enslave. 
In reflecting on the power of Connecticut courts to assign in- 
dependent weight to state constitutional provisions, in particular those 
relating to the protection of civil rights and liberties, Chief Justice Pe- 
ters has urged courts to search for historical data and precedents to 
illuminate the constitutional text. In the absence of such evidence, 
however, Chief Justice Peters urges courts to look to the agenda of the 
Connecticut Constitution as a whole in the context of the central his- 
torical and sociological issues present at the time of ratification.283 
Surely, in 1965, ten years after Brown and in the midst of the civil 
rights movement in which Connecticut citizens took such an early and 
active role, we must assume that the drafters of this extraordinary and 
unique provision recognized that some Connecticut citizens were still 
being subjected to segregation and discrimination in the exercise and 
enjoyment of their political and civil rights. They must have been 
equally aware that this condition resulted in the subjugation of these 
individuals to second-class citizen status which could no longer be tol- 
erated in a state committed to the equal worth of all persons under the 
law. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court expanded on this recognition in 
Horton by declaring "that in Connecticut, elementary and secondary 
education is a fundamental right, [and] that pupils in the public 
schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right . . . . 7,284 
Reading that holding into the language of Article I, Section 20, it 
seems clear that the Connecticut Constitution forbids any person to 
suffer segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his 
or her fundamental right to education. 
282. Palka v. Walker, 198 A. 265,267 (Conn. 1938). 
283. Peters, supra note 72, at 583-86. 
284. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,369-70 (Conn. 1977). 
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Connecticut courts have also adopted the rule of construction 
that effect must be given to every part and word of the constitution 
unless there is a clear reason for not doing so.285 By using the disjunc- 
tive "or" between "segregation" and "discrimination," the drafters 
must have intended the words to carry different import. Discrimina- 
tion may imply an invidious act by a wrongdoer.286 But to this consti- 
tutionally impermissible act, the drafters added a second condition- 
not to "segregate," which might also imply a conscious act of isolation, 
but rather a person's being "subjected to segregation." This condition 
arguably exists whenever a person is left to endure a segregated condi- 
tion which the state might reasonably prevent. 
The children in Hartford and its surrounding suburbs are being 
"subjected to segregation," and to its known harmful effects, when the 
State of Connecticut regards state-imposed school district lines as sac- 
rosanct and refuses to abridge them, as well as when a child's funda- 
mental right to an equal education is valued less highly than a town's 
interest in maintaining impermeable borders.287 By maintaining these 
so-called neutral systems, the state has consented to the continued 
subjugation of these children as second-class citizens in the majority 
culture. 
Many states have adopted this per se approach to government 
responsibility based on the premise that racially unbalanced schools 
are inherently unequal and that the failure of the state to remedy this 
unequal treatment of minorities is a denial of equal protection regard- 
less of the underlying causes.288 On this reasoning, intent and foresee- 
ability are irrelevant. In People ex rel. Lynch v. San Diego Unified 
School a California appellate court found that the knowing 
failure of a school board to remedy an imbalance that resulted in in- 
285. Cahill v. Leopold, 103 A2d 818,828 (Conn. 1954). 
286. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. 
287. Such borders can, of course, be readily breached to achieve cost savings in police 
and fire protection or garbage removal. Several sister states have recognized that the fixa- 
tion on local control must end if equality rights are to be preserved. See, e.g., Rose v. 
Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). In the Rose case, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that "[elach child . . . in this Commonwealth must be provided with an 
equal opportunity to have an adequate education. Equality is the keyword here. The chil- 
dren of the poor and the children of the rich . . . must be given the same opportunity and 
access . . . . This obligation cannot be shijted to local counties and local school districts." Id 
at 211 (emphasis added). Notably, Kentucky has produced some of the most outstanding 
examples of successful desegregation plans in the country, in particular the plan imple- 
mented in the central city of Jefferson County, Louisville. 
288. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 136, at 1515-16. 
289. 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972). 
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ferior education for African-American students was sufficient to attri- 
bute responsibility to the state for curing the pr0blem.2~~ 
A similar approach was taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Distr i~t .2~~ Recommending 
an interdistrict remedy to solve racial imbalance, the Court eschewed 
the seemingly inviolate nature of school district lines, saying "govern- 
mental subdivisions of the state may readily be bridged when neces- 
sary to vindicate state constitutional rights and policies."292 
The holdings in the three Horton cases, and the principle of "ba- 
sic fairness" which the Connecticut Supreme Court announced as un- 
derlying all equal protection cases under the Connecticut Constitution 
in Moscone v. Mans0n,2'~ argue in favor using the same per se ap- 
proach in Connecticut. This is particularly true in light of the clear 
and convincing evidence of the severe social, academic, and intellec- 
tual detriments suffered by children in segregated schools.294 The 
State's own experts originally recommended just such a per se ap- 
proach to segregative conditions, calling for "collective responsibility" 
among the cities and their contiguous and adjacent suburbs in eradi- 
cating racial imbalance in the schools.295 This recommendation was 
ultimately rejected by state officials who feared the political backlash 
of a mandatory approach to desegregation. Shortly after this rejec- 
tion, the Shefl case was filed. 
The State's knowing failure to eradicate the condition of metro- 
politan-wide school segregation currently existing in Connecticut is all 
the more intolerable because of the State's power to "define expecta- 
tions, confer legitimacy, establish a status quo, and thus necessarily 
shape the nature and distribution of interests and attitudes in society 
itself."296 By refusing to resolve the problem, the state affirms as inev- 
itable the status quo of racial imbalance and its effects in metropoli- 
tan-area schools. Surely, this is a constitutionally impermissible result. 
290. Id at 666. 
291. 279 A.2d 619 (N.J. 1971). 
292. Id. at 629. 
293. 440 A.2d 848 (Conn. 1981). 
294. See infra Part III(b), for discussion of numerous research projects which have enu- 
merated these harms. 
295. COMM. ON RACIAL EQUALITY, CONN. ST. BD. OF EDUC., A REPORT ON  RACIAL^ 
ETHNIC EQUITY AND DESEGREGATION IN CONNE~CUT'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11-18 (Jan. 
1988). 
296. Tribe, Constitutional Theories, supra note 136, at 1078. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  23 H a s t i n g s  C o n s t .  L.Q. 397 1995-1996 
398 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:351 
IIIb. The Value of Successfully Desegregated Schools: 
An Empirical Review 
A per se approach to segregative conditions under state constitu- 
tional provisions is supported by empirical research studies which af- 
firm the value of racially balanced schools to minority and White 
students alike, to their parents, and to the society at large. Depriva- 
tion of the opportunity to attend such schools in many metropolitan 
areas of the United States has exacerbated the problems of the inner 
cities and made the words of Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in Milli- 
ken v. Bradley, seem particularly prescient: "In the short run, it may 
seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to 
be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other black-but it 
is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret."297 
It seems especially fitting to recall Justice Marshall's words and to 
use them as a starting point for assessing the results of school desegre- 
gation plans in our nation's cities. However, there is a bittersweet 
irony in this assessment. Professor Liebman has answered the ques- 
tion, "Is school desegregation dead?" by observing that school deseg- 
regation appears to be "alive and well" throughout the South in cities 
like Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina; Greenville, South Caro- 
lina; Jacksonville, Florida; Louisville, Kentucky; Nashville-Davidson, 
Tennessee; and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida, where mandatory 
school desegregation plans came with a court order in the late-1960s 
and early 1970s, and stayed to become a source of intense civic 
pride.298 To this exemplary list must be added Stamford, Connecticut, 
297. 418 U.S. 717, 814-15 (1974). 
298. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1465-67, specifically 1466 nn.6 & 7. I would concur in 
Leibman's "alive and well" assessment. To his list I would add Darien, Georgia, one of the 
cities which, in addition to Charlotte, Greenville, Louisville and Tampa, I have studied 
over the last four years on several trips south to visit successfully desegregated school dis- 
tricts. Each of the cities visited was desegregated as part of a county-wide plan, and each 
has been exceptionally successful in retaining a commitment to racial balance over the 
years, despite major demographic changes in their counties. 
I should say at the outset of this research-oriented section that what may appear to be 
my emphasis on the "benefits" side of the research data, which is by far the most volumi- 
nous, most likely stems from my having seen first hand the power of the law to change a 
society's fundamental values. Twenty-five years after Jim Crow ruled in these counties, I 
have seen minority and White children learning and playing together in modem, well- 
maintained and well-equipped schools, some of the finest I have seen in 30 years in educa- 
tion, first as a teacher, then as director of an educational research facility, and now as a 
professor of law. I have visited schools in each district and interviewed students, teachers, 
parents, and school administrators, all of whom were anxious to tell me how it can be done 
when people are committed and "it's the law of the land." While outside of the South, 
many of us have prayed that busing and desegregation would never come to our cities, 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  23 H a s t i n g s  C o n s t .  L.Q. 398 1995-1996 
Winter 19961 STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 399 
which alone among Connecticut's cities has succeeded in effectively 
integrating its schools, also under a mandatory school desegregation 
plan. 
What makes for successful desegregation? The most authorita- 
tive current empirical research has established that substantial pro- 
gress has been achieved in school districts with court or 
administratively-ordered desegregation plans, whereas little or no 
progress has been noted in the eighty-five percent of school districts 
without such plans.299 The same research has shown that the highest 
level of progress has been achieved in areas in which the desegrega- 
tion plan was mandatory rather than voluntary, where desegregation 
occurred at all grade levels from the plan's inception, and where the 
plan included interdistrict desegregation techniques such as "pairing" 
and "~luster ing."~~~ County-wide plans were particularly effective. 
these courageous people have been conducting a vast 25-year experiment in social change 
for the nation. I have reviewed twenty-five years of standardized test scores and have 
concluded that the gains in these successful districts are even more impressive than those 
homogenized over an entire region and reflected in the national studies. I have inter- 
viewed business executives and civic leaders in Greenville, South Carolina, who have told 
me that their region's current status as the engine of American economic growth could 
never have been achieved in a segregated society and without their twenty-five year "in- 
vestment in human capital!' E.g., interviews with Arnold Norz, Vice-President, Metropoli- 
tan Life Ins. Co.; Becky lhmer, C.E.O.. Haywood Mall Dev. Corp.; Max Heller, former 
Exec. Dir., Economic Dev. Bd., State of South Carolina, Rudolph Gordon, Asst. Superin- 
tendent, Greenville County Schools, and others, in Greenville, South Carolina (Feb. 21-24, 
1994). When I think of the South 25 years ago with its intense hatreds, its poverty, and 
what must have seemed the great unlikelihood of success, I confess to impatience when it is 
said that a court-mandated planning process in Connecticut, the most affluent state in the 
nation, will cause "blood to run in the streets." I hope, therefore, I will be forgiven if the 
tone of this section is not totally that of the neutral observer, but rather of one who has 
gone to see it work-and marvelled. 
299. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1468 (citing FINIS WELCH & AUDREY LIGHT, NEW 
EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 40,67, and Table 12 (U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights 
Clearinghouse Publ. 92 1987)). 
300. The "pairing" of schools involves taking a group of schools in a metropolitan area 
which has heretofore been racially and ethnically segregated and pairing one minority and 
one white school which are geographically proximate to each other. One elementary 
school which has previously included grades K-6 is typically converted into a K-3 school 
and the other, a 4-6 school, thus achieving racial balance in both and minimizing the dis- 
tance travelled to school by all children in that "paired" area. By "clustering" a group of 
schools in one area of the county and reorganizing the grade levels so that grades K-12 can 
all be served in this concentrated area, many southern districts were able to tell parents 
whose children were entering the district at kindergarten, exactly which schools their chil- 
dren would attend from grades K-12, barring unforeseen demographic changes which 
might necessitate re-assignment. This technique also minimized travel distances and 
calmed the fears of parents who had been unnerved by the anti-busing shibboleth, "small 
children will spend hours on buses travelling to outlying areas," as well as by the specter of 
their child's moving from school to school each year to achieve racial balance. Interviews 
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The irony, of course, is that many of these county-wide plans were 
implemented in the South, the region which has demonstrated the 
most progress in integrati~n.~~' 
In the generation since these executive branch and court-ordered 
desegregation plans were initiated, widespread progress, which could 
only be predicted in 1954, has been substantiated by empirical re- 
search. Writing in 1965, Professor Fiss catalogued the various harms 
which were said to result from segregation: the psychological harm to 
African-American children, who feel insult and stigma whether their 
schools have been de jure or de facto segregated; the academic and 
intellectual harms resulting from inferior school plants, educational 
materials, teachers, and curricula; and the perpetuation of social barri- 
ers which results when minority children are deprived of the further 
opportunity to "develop relationships with . . . members of the domi- 
nant class."302 Professor Fiss acknowledged the difficulty in drawing 
causal connections in the absence of empirical data showing that such 
harms can be remedied by attacking the segregated condition, but ar- 
gued that support for this proposition "is suggested by the embryonic 
indications of improved . . . achievement by [minority students] in in- 
tegrated schools."303 
Today, these indications are no longer embryonic. Vol~nes  of 
research data in several disciplines now indicate that minority ?er- 
formance in desegregated schools has improved, and minority per- 
formance on standardized achievement tests has risen in desegregated 
settings.304 It has also been well-documented that career opportuni- 
with school officials in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County and others named supra note 298, 
October 1991, January 1993, and February 1994. 
301. See WELCH & LIGHT, supra note 299, at n.6 Tables 1, Al, and A2. 
302. Fiss, Constitutional Concepts, supra note 110, at 568-570. 
303. Id. at 569. 
304. The most highly-respected researchers on minority achievement have concluded 
that attendance in racially balanced schools improves the educational outcomes for minor- 
ity students. See Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in 
Desegregated Schools, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103, 124 
(Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983); Willis D. Hawley & Mark A. Smylie, 
The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial Integra- 
tion, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 284-85 (Phyllis Katz and Dal- 
mas Taylor eds., 1988); Christopher Jencks & M. Brown, The Effects of Desegregation on 
Student Achievement: Some New Evidence from the Equality of Educational Opportunity 
Survey, 48 Soc. OF EDUC. 136-37 (1975); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Desegregation 
and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, in 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17-56 
(1978); Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, The Effect of Research Methodology on Deseg- 
regation-Achievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, in 88(5) AM. J. Soc. 839-54 (1983); Paul M. 
Wortman & Fred B. Bryant, School Desegregation and Black Achievement: An Integrative 
Review, in 13(3) Soc. METHODS AND RES. 289-324 (1985). See generally JAMES S. COLE- 
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ties of minorities attending desegregated schools have improved.305 
This evidence is particularly important because other studies have 
shown that the isolation of minorities in poor urban areas is the great- 
est barrier to their social and economic mobility.306 
Professor Liebman has also cited extensive research indicating 
that in addition to improvements in standardized test scores and ca- 
reer options, minority students have made substantial gains in I.Q. 
scores which erase a third to one-half of the overall difference be- 
tween African-American and White students.307 These gains, widely 
believed to be due to the changing expectations of African-American 
students by teachers in desegregated settings, are strongest when de- 
segregation begins in the early grades, has a metropolitan-wide plan, 
and takes place in predominately white schools with a critical mass of 
African-American students.308 The preponderance of the evidence 
MAN ET AL, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); NANCY H. ST. JOHN, 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. 
Mahard, Minorify Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in EFFEC~IVE SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION: EQUITY. QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY (Wllis D. Hawley ed., 1981) [here- 
inafter EFFEC~~VE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION]. Notably, many of the gains reported can be 
impaired by techniques such as "ability-group tracking," which may create segregated 
classes within desegregated schools. See generally MEYER WEINBERG, THE SEARCH FOR 
QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION: POLICY AND RESEARCH ON MINORITY STUDENTS IN 
SCHOOL AND COLLEGE 146-71 (1983); William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the 
Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE LJ. 1700, 1710-11 nn.36-42 (1986). 
305. Attending desegregated schools apparently helps African-American students 
break through the structural bamers to employment which have resulted from discrimina- 
tion in the labor market. There are many other employment-related benefits. African- 
American students who attend racially balanced schools tend to have more friends in the 
majority culture, to live in integrated neighborhoods, to finish high school andlor college, 
and to work in higher status jobs upon graduation. See Jomills H. Braddock, I1 &James M. 
McPartland, Going to College and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in 
E F F E ~ V E  SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, supra note 304, at 141-54; Jomills H. Braddock, I1 & 
James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial Segregation: 
The Relationship Bemeen School and Employment Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267- 
89 (1989); Jon W. Hoelter, Segregation and Rationality in Black Status Aspiration 
Processes, 55 Soc. OF EDUC. 31-39 (1982); and Gary Orfield, Housing Pattern and Deseg- 
regation Policy, in E m m v E  Scxioo~ DESEGREGATION, supra note 304 at 185-224. See 
generally ROBERT L. CRAM & JACK STRAUSS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION A D BLACK Oc- 
CUPATIONAL AT~AINMENT: RESULTS FROM A LONG-TERM EXPERIMENT (1985); G. 
THOMAS, THE ACCESS AND SUCCESS OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS IN U.S. GRADUATE AND 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1986). 
306. See T. COOK, BLACK ACHIEVEMENT AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 985 (1984) 
(finding that African-American students educated in desegregated schools are more likely 
to graduate from high school and college and to major in more remunerative subjects). See 
generally WILLIAM J. WILSON. THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987). 
307. See Liebman, supra note 136, at 1624-25 n.675. 
308. See generally Jomills H .  Braddock, I1 & James M. McPartland, The Social and 
Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, E a u i n  & CHOICE, Feb. 1988. 
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also suggests that African-American students who attend desegre- 
gated schools feel less stigmatized by race. Moreover, desegregation 
has been shown to make both African-American and White students 
who attend such schools from an early age more comfortable in ra- 
cially integrated settings as a d ~ l t s . 3 ~ ~  Progress for Hispanic students 
in desegregated schools, though not yet as widely researched, appears 
to be equally irnpressive?1° 
It is particularly important to note that none of this progress by 
minority students has been achieved at the expense of White students' 
progress, as had been feared in 1954 and is still feared today. Studies 
of student achievement in desegregated settings have shown that 
White achievement test scores have either risen slightly or stayed the 
same?ll It has also been shown that white students have benefited 
from the school reforms which typically are initiated as part of a de- 
segregation plan, as well as the increases in teacher training and inter- 
racial cooperation that desegregation fosters.312 White students, as 
well as minority students, benefit from learning to function in a ra- 
cially diverse environment, a prerequisite for functioning in the ra- 
cially diverse workforce of the future.313 
Nor has racial animosity or "white flight," which may occur at the 
beginning stages of a given implementation plan, been a permanent 
result.314 In fact, those metropolitan areas which have implemented 
successful desegregation plans have actually experienced the lowest 
rates of white flight because of the enlargement of school district 
cachement areas beyond city boundaries and the unlinking of school 
309. Liebman, supra note 136, at 1630 (quoting AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCA- 
TION 160,163). 
310. See U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN-AMERICAN EDUCATION STUDY (Re- 
ports I-VI, April 1971-February 1974); MexicanoIChicano Concerns in School Desegrega- 
tion in Los Angeles (Monograph No. 9, UCLA Chicano Studies Center, 1977). 
311. See WEINBERG, supra note 304, passim See also the work of one of the State of 
Connecticut's own researchers: JANET W. SCHOFIELD, CONN. ST. DEP'T OF EDUC., REVIEW 
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION'S IMPACT ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL STU- 
DENTS (1989). 
312. Desegregation has led to more educational reform than any other "school reform" 
methodology. MEYER WEINBERG, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., MINORITY STUDENTS: A RE- 
SEARCH APPRAISAL 329 (1977). 
313. U.S. LABOR DEP'T, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE TWENTY- 
FIRST CENTURY (1987); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N PROJECT 2000: JOB AND 
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1984). Both of these reports 
concluded that the workforce of the future will be increasingly multiracial and that those 
workers who know how to function effectively in these job settings will have substantial 
employment advantages. 
314. Liebman, supra note 136. at 1622. 
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attendance zones and places of residence?15 Ironically, it is those 
cases in which the cities alone have been included in the desegregation 
remedy-such as Detroit, Kansas City, St. Louis, Boston, and 
others-or those which have implemented no desegregation plan at 
all, which have experienced the highest incidence of white flight?16 
On a related issue, it is also important to note that in Sheff, the 
lower court's finding that school segregation is largely the result of 
residential segregation beyond the power of courts to rectify is contra- 
dicted by research. Empirical studies indicate that although the two 
forms of segregation are related, the causal connection actually runs in 
the opposite direction.317 One of many studies concluded that school 
desegregation between 1968 and 1973 doubled the rate of housing in- 
tegration in 25 central cities with an African-American population of 
at least 100,000?18 Another study of 960 school districts found that 
cities which implemented metropolitan-wide desegregation plans ex- 
perienced substantially increased housing integration, an effect evi- 
dent in districts of all sizes and in all regions of the c0untry.3~~ Other 
studies have indicated that districts which have experienced desegre- 
gation over the longest period of time have the lowest levels of hous- 
ing segregation as 
Therefore, it would appear that the Sheff lower court's finding 
that school segregation is the result of housing segregation may be 
false, as is the notion that the state is powerless to effect desegregation 
in either of these areas. The lower court's adoption of this view in 
315. See id at 1621 and particularly 1621-29 nn.664-693. See also WELCH & LIGHT, 
supra note 299, at 3-4. 
3i6. ~d 
317. See generally JOMILLS H. BRADDOCK, II & JAMES M. MCPARTLAND, MORE EVI- 
DENCE ON THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT PERPETUATE MINORW SEGRE- 
GATION: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND HOUSING 
DESEGREGATION (Johns Hopkins University, Center for the Social Organization of the 
Schools, Report 338,1983); WILLIS D. HAWLEY, AL., STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DE- 
SEGREGATION: LESSONS FROM RESEARCH (1983); Gary Orfield, Housing Patterns and De- 
segregation Policy, supra note 305, passim; DIANA PEARCE, NAT'L INST. OF EDUC., 
BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE I M P A ~  OF METROPOLITAN SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION O HOUSING PAT~ERNS (1980); and Meyer Weinberg, Housing and 
School Desegregation: Citizen Initiatives and Government Responses, 18 INTEGRATED EDU- 
C A ~ O N  2-11 (July-August 1980). 
318. Diana Pearce, Robert L. Crain, & R. Farley, Lessons Not Lost: The Impact of 
School Desegregation on the Racial Ecology of Large American Central Cities, Paper 
presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New Orle- 
ans (April 1984) (on file with author). 
319. Karl Taeuber, Desegregation of Public School Districts: Persistence and Change, 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN, September 1990, at 18-24. 
320. See PEARCE, supra note 317, passim. 
Heinonline - -  23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 403 1995-1996 
404 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23351 
Sheff merely contributes to the perception that segregated schools in 
inner cities are inevitable, and that white flight "is an inherently pri- 
vate matter beyond the scope of the law."321 
Much of the research data referred to above has been further 
documented by the State of Connecticut's own blue ribbon commis- 
sions which have studied this growing problem since 1965.322 These 
prestigious groups have consistently recommended that the state do 
everything in its power to rectify the segregated conditions which now 
exist in Connecticut's schools. In reaching their conclusions, they 
have relied on some of the data cited herein, as well as their own 
commissioned report by Janet W. S~hof i e ld .~~~  
In reaching its own decision in Sheff, the lower court appears to 
have ignored this data as well as voluminous testimony at trial from 
many of the most respected researchers in the country, who verified 
the research findings referred to in this section, and more. As the 
Findings of Fact issued on June 27,1995 make clear, the court relied 
instead on the testimony of the handful of experts who disputed this 
body of research, only to find that the real problem in the Hartford 
schools is not that they are racially segregated but rather that the chil- 
dren attending these schools are so poor.324 Poverty, the court ex- 
plained, is the strongest predictor of low academic achievement325 
(and, of course, is another factor beyond the power of the court to 
remedy). Reasoning circularly, the court found that, taking the dis- 
parity in socio-economic class into account, the children in Hartford 
schools and those of its surrounding, largely White and affluent sub- 
urbs are scoring at about the level one would expect on the state mas- 
tery tests326 and therefore are receiving a "minimally adequate 
ed~cation."~" In effect, the court tells us that minority children are 
doing as well as can be expected under the circumstances while ignor- 
ing twenty years of research indicating what can be accomplished 
when the circumstances are changed. By refusing to acknowledge the 
321. Tribe, Constitutional Physics, supra note 136, at 28. See also supra note 185 and 
accompanying text. 
322. See, e.g, Gov.'s COMM'N ON QUALITY AND INTEGRATED EDUC., CROSSING THE 
BRIDGE TO EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE: A VISION OF QUALITY AND INTEGRATED QUALITY 
AND INTEGRATED EDUC. FOR CONN. (DEc. 1990) [hereinafter CROSSING THE BRIDGE]; 
CONN. ST. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUALITY AND INTEGRATED EDUC.: O ~ O N S  FOR CONN. 
(April 1989) (Follow-up Report to the January 1988 Report). 
323. See SCHOFIELD, supra note 311. 
324. Sheff v. O'Neill, No. SC15255,1995 Conn. LEXIS 249, at *30-*43 (June 27,1995). 
325. Id at *31. 
326. Id at *42-*43. 
327. Id at *40-*41. 
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power of courts to change the circumstances of children's lives, the 
court has, like the federal courts before it, declared the status quo to 
be inevitable. 
This solid empirical record of progress has not been matched by 
any of the alternative approaches to providing equal educational op- 
portunity in racially isolated settings such as "separate but enhanced 
schools" (termed the "gilded ghetto" approach by Liebman and 
others), "effective schools," school-based management methodolo- 
gies, all-minority high schools, minority control of city school boards 
and other political institutions, and decentralized school 
This failure by minority students to achieve equal educational and so- 
cial progress in segregated settings under plans which focus on "equal 
treatment and equal access" or other "make-do in segregated schools7' 
methodologies, has also been noted by the Governor's Commission 
on Quality and Integrated Educatio11,3~~ the state's second group of 
experts to stress the vital importance of racially balanced school set- 
tings to the school achievement and social adjustment of minority chil- 
dren in a majority c ~ l t u r e . 3 ~ ~  
Perhaps if the research data were not so compelling, it might yet 
be possible to argue that the State can provide equal educational op- 
portunity in ways other than by assuring integrated school settings to 
all Connecticut public school students. In Brown, the Supreme Court 
declared that segregated schools were inherently unequal, largely on 
the basis of tentative sociological There now appear to be 
more than adequate indicators that this statement is correct: separate 
can never be equal. To deprive Connecticut students, as well as their 
parents and their communities, of the social, intellectual, academic, 
and career achievements documented as achievable in successfully in- 
tegrated schools, must be seen as a per se deprivation of the funda- 
mental right to the equal educational opportunity mandated in 
H o r t o r ~ ~ ~ ~  because, as we now know, a like opportunity cannot be pro- 
vided in any other way. 
IV. Conclusion 
State courts have a long history of independent constitutional ad- 
judication under state constitutional provisions. More recently, the 
328. Liebman, supra note 136. at 1489-91 n.142. 
329. See CROSSING THE BRIDGE, supra note 322. 
330. See SCHOFIELD, supra note 311. 
331. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 n.l1,495 (1954). 
332. 376 A.2d 359,369-70 (Conn. 1977). 
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Connecticut Supreme Court has creatively construed its own constitu- 
tion to provide additional protections to the rights and liberties of 
Connecticut citizens beyond federal minimums. The lower court's de- 
cision in Sheff v. O'Neill fails to fulfill the promise of that legacy, even 
as it fails to protect the fundamental rights of some of the most vulner- 
able of those citizens. 
Should the Connecticut Supreme Court affirm the Sheff lower 
court's opinion, it will be perpetuating the serious error made at the 
federal level over twenty years ago. The United States Supreme 
Court in effect said in Milliken, "We know that you are being deprived 
of an equal educational opportunity due to your required attendance 
in racially, ethnically and socio-economically segregated schools 
within state-authorized attendance zones, but unless affirmative dis- 
criminatory acts of the state have 'caused' the problem, we cannot 
help you." This error has made one of the most troubling domestic 
issues facing our country-perhaps the defining problem of American 
hi~tory~~~-al l  but impossible to cure. However, there is one impor- 
tant daerence. The Connecticut Supreme Court will be acting with 
full access to a body of extensive research unavailable when Milliken 
was decided in 1974. Whether such findings would have diverted the 
Milliken majority from their doctrinal course cannot be known. But 
the moral dilemma for a Connecticut court acting under Connecticut 
constitutional provisions in 1996 is substantially increased. 
Instead, the Connecticut Supreme Court should overrule the 
Shefllower court's decision and, pursuant to their obligation to inde- 
pendently construe the provisions of the Connecticut Constitution, de- 
clare that the federal state action/discriminatory intentJcausation 
standard, which has hampered federal courts in solving the pernicious 
problem of metropolitan-wide segregation, has no place in Connecti- 
cut state constitutional adjudication. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court should build on the excellent 
foundation laid in Horton and take the lead from other states such as 
Montana where the Montana Supreme Court declared a fundamental 
state right to education and held that the state constitutional guaran- 
tee of equality of educational opportunity was not merely an aspira- 
tional goal but a real guarantee, binding on all three branches of 
government, whether at the state, local, or school district 
Surely, in light of what we now know can be achieved by making good 
on such a guarantee, the school-age plaintiffs in Shefldeserve no less. 
333. See Liebman, supra note 136, at 1473. 
334. Helena Elem. Sch. Dist v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 684-88 (Mont. 1989). 
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